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1 
MEDICAL NECESSITY: A HIGHER HURDLE 
FOR MARGINALIZED TAXPAYERS? 
Julie Furr Youngman & Courtney D. Hauck 
 Civil rights protection for transgender people—and in particular 
access to affordable health care—is currently the subject of intense 
political scrutiny, with a hostile administration chipping away at legal 
protections. Among other setbacks, a federal district court enjoined 
regulatory guidelines that were issued in 2016 to clarify that the 
federal prohibition on sex discrimination in health insurance applies 
to discrimination on the basis of gender identity and transgender 
status, and the promulgating agency itself is now reconsidering the 
guidelines. Without explicit federal protections against discrimination 
by health insurers and in the face of uneven state law protections, the 
ability to deduct costs associated with gender transition-related health 
care that are not covered by insurance on one’s personal income taxes 
has taken on new significance for the transgender population.  This 
article takes a new look at the 2010 decision of the United States Tax 
Court in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in 
which the Court held that a transgender taxpayer could deduct certain 
transition-related medical expenses on her federal income tax return, 
but not others. This article argues that, while the O’Donnabhain 
decision may legitimize transition-related treatments as medically 
appropriate in the insurance context, the Court overreached by 
considering whether the costs at issue were “medically necessary” 
and “widely accepted” in the medical community, requirements that 
the federal tax code does not impose. In so doing, the decision risks 
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imposing an unwarranted burden of proof on transgender people and 
potentially on other marginalized populations. This article explores 
the implications of the O’Donnabhain decision for transgender health 
care in the current political and legal climate, and explores strategies 
to protect health care rights for transgender people and other 
marginalized communities, with a focus on the medical deduction for 
individual federal income taxes.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The topic of civil rights protection for transgender people is 
currently the subject of intense scrutiny from all sides, from politics to 
academia to the nation’s courts. In particular, the cost of transgender 
health care, as well as the availability and scope of insurance coverage 
to pay for it, has become a topic of greater focus at both the federal 
and state level. The most recent developments, however, aim to make 
the process of obtaining and affording health care more burdensome 
for transgender individuals rather than less so. 
In December 2017, the Trump administration banned the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention from using the term “transgender” 
in its 2018 budget documents.1 Prior to that, in the summer of 2017, 
President Trump cited the allegedly high cost of transgender health 
care as a reason for banning transgender people from serving in the 
U.S. military; in the same order, he banned “the use of [Department of 
Defense] and [Department of Homeland Security] resources to fund 
sex-reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel.”2 In 
March 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau reversed plans to collect data on 
transgender individuals in the upcoming 2020 Census, which would 
have provided important information on such matters as uninsured 
rates and lack of access to health care among transgender populations.3 
And, with the farthest reaching effects of all, Obama-era guidelines 
published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) in May 2016, which clarified that a federal prohibition on 
sex discrimination in health insurance includes discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity and transgender status, were undermined by 
two events: in December 2016, in litigation challenging the guidelines 
on religious grounds, a federal court enjoined their implementation, 
and then in July 2017 HHS itself secured a stay of the litigation while 
it reassesses the guidelines and considers amending them.4 The 
 
 1. Juliet Eilperin & Lena H. Sun, CDC Gets List of Forbidden Words: Fetus, Transgender, 
Diversity, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/cdc-gets-list-of-forbidden-words-fetus-transgender-diversity/2017/12/15/f503837a-e1cf-
11e7-89e8-edec16379010_story.html?utm_term=.45a3636767ea (other banned terms include: 
“science-based,” “evidence-based,” “diversity,” and “vulnerable”). 
 2. See Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, 82 Fed. Reg. 41319 (Aug. 25, 2017) (banning transgender participation in the U.S. armed 
forces); see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Surprises Military with a Transgender Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2017, at A1. 
 3. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra Section II(A). 
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prevalence of an antagonistic attitude in the current administration, as 
evidenced by these events, coupled with the lack of explicit 
enforceable statutory protections for transgender health care at both 
the state and federal levels of government, poses challenges for 
transgender people seeking affordable health care. 
Typically, many Americans can look to their health insurance 
(whether provided by Medicare or Medicaid programs, or by private 
health insurers) to pay for the medical care they need, and many can 
deduct any remaining health care costs that are not covered by 
insurance from their income on their individual federal income tax 
returns using the medical deduction as a means of offsetting some of 
the burden of those out-of-pocket expenses. Likewise, transgender 
people may seek both insurance coverage and income tax deductions 
for the cost of their transition-related care, which may include 
psychotherapy, hormone therapy, gender conformity surgery,5 and 
other surgeries. The availability of the former (insurance coverage) 
may be limited to those treatments that are deemed “medically 
necessary,” depending upon the governing laws in the patient’s home 
state and on the terms of his or her insurance policy. The Internal 
Revenue Code, however, does not apply a “medical necessity” 
requirement to the latter (the income tax deduction for medical care) 
so long as a deducted expense meets the Code’s definition of medical 
care, discussed in more detail below.6 The Internal Revenue Service 
and the Tax Court has not generally questioned whether particular 
medical treatments, even non-traditional and non-mainstream 
treatments, are “medically necessary” or even widely accepted before 
allowing deductions, so long as the taxpayer and his or her health care 
provider believe the treatment would aid in diagnosing, curing, 
alleviating, or treating a disease or medical condition.7 Yet a recent 
decision of the United States Tax Court appears to import a “medical 
necessity” threshold for transgender people seeking to use the medical 
deduction for transition-related medical expenses, unjustifiably and 
disproportionately disadvantaging this already marginalized group. 
 
 5. Gender conformity surgery is also sometimes called Gender Affirmation Surgery, Gender 
Confirmation Surgery, Sex Reassignment Surgery (SRS), or Gender Reassignment Surgery (GRS). 
Glossary of Gender and Transgender Terms, THE FENWAY INST., http://fenwayhealth.org/docume 
nts/the-fenway-institute/handouts/Handout_7-C_Glossary_of_Gender_and_Transgender_Terms 
_fi.pdf (last updated Apr. 8, 2018). 
 6. I.R.C. § 213(d) (2017). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 262–63. 
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Admittedly, the United States Tax Court’s 2010 decision in 
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue8 creates 
precedent allowing transgender people to deduct certain transition-
related medical expenses such as hormone therapy and gender 
conformity surgery on their federal income tax returns, representing a 
significant but preliminary step on the way to legitimizing such 
expenses as deductible, medically appropriate, and insurable in other 
contexts. Yet the O’Donnabhain Court may have gone too far by 
unnecessarily addressing whether the treatments were “widely 
accepted” and whether the costs at issue were “medically necessary,” 
requirements that the federal tax code does not impose, instead of 
simply answering the question actually mandated by applicable tax 
regulations: whether the treatments at issue met the definition of 
deductible “medical care” without being ruled out by the exception for 
“cosmetic surgery.”9 The holding may be helpful to transgender 
people seeking coverage of transition-related treatments in the 
insurance context. But by applying the higher—and unfounded—
standard of “medical necessity” in the tax context, the Court 
unnecessarily inserted itself into the political debate over the 
appropriateness of various treatments for transgender patients. It 
thereby imposed a gratuitous hurdle that, if taken as more authoritative 
than the dicta that it is, may be used to harm taxpayers—both those 
who are transgender and those who are not—in the future by 
preventing them from deducting the cost of legitimate but uninsured 
medical care from their taxes simply because the decision-maker—
whether an Internal Revenue agent or future Tax Court panel—finds 
the treatment to be experimental or non-traditional, or is otherwise not 
persuaded of its absolute necessity and wide acceptance. In light of the 
recent events described above, a fresh look at the O’Donnabhain 
decision is in order. 
This Article describes the current climate for transgender health 
care and coverage and explores strategies to protect health care rights 
for transgender people and other marginalized communities, with a 
focus on the medical deduction for individual federal income taxes. 
Part I describes the widely-accepted best practices for transgender 
health care and identifies challenges to obtaining that care in the 
 
 8. 134 T.C. 34 (2010). 
 9. I.R.C. § 213(d) (2017). 
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United States. Part II analyzes current federal and state regulations 
governing transgender health care and their implications for 
transgender people living in different states. Part III explains the 
federal tax deduction for medical expenses and its application to 
gender transition-related care. Part IV discusses the Tax Court’s 
decision in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner as it relates to these issues 
and questions some of its reasoning and conclusions. Finally, Part V 
explores the implications of the ruling for transgender health care in 
the context of current federal and state legislation and guidance, 
including considerations for legal, political, and medical professionals 
seeking to protect the interests of transgender people and other 
marginalized populations. 
I.  TRANSGENDER MEDICAL NEEDS AND CHALLENGES 
A.  Transgender People Face High Rates of Illness and Poverty 
Studies show that transgender populations experience a wide 
range of minority stressors at higher rates than the population at large. 
Before delving into the specifics, clarification of the current 
understanding of the term “transgender” may be useful. According to 
the American Psychological Association (“APA”), the term 
“transgender” refers to the state of “having a gender identity that 
differs from one’s sex assigned at birth,”10 while the American 
Psychiatric Association defines it as “the broad spectrum of 
individuals who transiently or persistently identify with a gender 
different from their gender at birth.”11 Notably, being transgender does 
not necessarily mean that one wishes to transition (change one’s 
gender role)12 or undergo gender conformity surgery; rather, 
“transgender” is “an umbrella term for persons whose gender identity, 
gender expression [such as dress] or behavior does not conform to that 
typically associated with the sex to which they were assigned at 
birth.”13 This includes individuals “who identify with binary gender 
 
 10. The Psychology of Transgender: Eight Questions for Transgender Expert Walter 
Bockting, PhD, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/ 
2015/11/psychology-transgender.aspx. 
 11. What is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/pati 
ents-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 12. The Psychology of Transgender: Eight Questions for Transgender Expert Walter 
Bockting, PhD, supra note 10. 
 13. Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
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identities (e.g., trans men, trans women) and/or nonbinary gender 
identities (e.g., gender-queer, gender-bender, gender-fluid, agender, 
bigender).”14 An estimated 1.4 million transgender people live in the 
United States today.15 Those individuals face numerous challenges, 
not the least of which is that they are statistically more likely than the 
adult population at large to experience poverty, as well as a wide range 
of mental and physical health issues, and to encounter obstacles in 
obtaining treatment for those issues. 
According to transgender psychology expert Dr. Walter 
Bockting, “[h]ealth disparities in the area of mental health are well 
documented among this population. Transgender people are more 
vulnerable to symptoms of depression and anxiety, which is at least in 
part attributable to the social stress they experience as members of a 
gender minority population.”16 Even in the population in general, 
studies show that stigma and discrimination subject an individual to 
feelings of loneliness, isolation, hopelessness, and depression, all of 
which are factors associated with suicide; thus, the stigma and 
discrimination associated with being transgender can magnify suicide 
rates among transgender populations in particular.17 According to one 
study, among transgender people surveyed, “41% of respondents 
reported attempting suicide compared to 1.6% of the general 
population;”18 another source estimates that “[54%] of transgender 
youth have attempted suicide and 21% resort to self-mutilation.”19 
 
 14. Elliot A. Tebbe & Bonnie Moradi, Suicide Risk in Trans Populations: An Application of 
Minority Stress Theory, 63 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 520, 520 (2016). 
 15. Jan Hoffman, Estimate of U.S. Transgender Population Doubles to 1.4 Million Adults, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/health/transgender-population. 
html?_r=0. This estimate came from a survey asking people whether they considered themselves 
to be transgender, with interviewers being instructed to define the term transgender as someone 
who “experience[s] a different gender identity from their sex at birth.” Andrew R. Flores et al., 
How Many Adults Identify as Transgender in the United States?, THE WILLIAMS INST. 3, 7 (June 
2016), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-
Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf. 
 16. The Psychology of Transgender: Eight Questions for Transgender Expert Walter 
Bockting, PhD, supra note 10. 
 17. Tebbe & Moradi, supra note 14, at 520–33. 
 18. See Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender 
Discrimination Survey, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE 72 (2011), http://www.thetask 
force.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf; see also Tebbe & Moradi, supra 
note 14, at 520 (“Estimated lifetime prevalence of suicide attempts in trans populations ranges from 
26% to 45% . . . .”). 
 19. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 512: HEALTH 
CARE FOR TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS 118 (2011) (hereinafter “ACOG Policy”). 
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A study of transgender people in the San Francisco area illustrates 
the incidence and effects of stigma and discrimination on that 
population: Among the sample, “59% of participants reported 
experiencing rape, 36% reported physical victimization . . . , 83% 
reported verbal discrimination . . . , and 62% reported other forms of 
discrimination (e.g., being fired, evicted or denied housing, denied 
access to health care services) as a result of gender identity.”20 
Significantly, the study noted that “participants’ experiences of rape 
and each of the forms of gender identity-based discrimination were 
associated positively with attempted suicide.”21 In addition, 
transgender people experience high rates of depression and substance 
abuse, two general risk factors for suicide in the general population. 
The lifetime prevalence of depression in transgender populations is 
estimated to exceed 50%, compared to 16% in the general 
population.22 Further, “approximately 17% of trans women and 33% 
of trans men reported past alcohol problems” compared to World 
Health Organization estimates of “1.9% for women and 5.5% for 
men . . . in the United States.”23 Both minority stressors and increased 
rates of depression and substance abuse result in “individual 
differences in depression and suicide risk in transgender 
populations.”24 
Additionally, the stigma associated with the transgender 
population often makes it difficult for transgender people to access 
resources such as education, health care, employment, and housing.25 
These issues are compounded by, and potentially contribute to, high 
rates of poverty among transgender Americans. Transgender 
Americans are between three and four times more likely to have a 
household income under $10,000 per year than the population as a 
whole, and 34% of African American transgender people reported 
incomes at this level compared to 9% of all African Americans.26 
 
 20. Tebbe & Moradi, supra note 14, at 521. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 521-22. 
 23. Id. at 522. 
 24. Id. at 530. 
 25. HIV Among Transgender People, CENTERS FOR DISEASE AND CONTROL PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/gender/transgender/index.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2017) 
(hereinafter “CDC HIV Among Transgender Webpage”). 
 26. Paying an Unfair Price: The Financial Penalty for Being Transgender in America, 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (2015), http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/paying-an-unfair-
price-transgender.pdf. 
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Finally, transgender people face additional challenges due to 
heightened rates of physical illnesses such as HIV and AIDS. 
According to the Center for Disease Control: 
Multiple factors have put transgender people at risk for HIV 
infection and transmission, including multiple sexual 
partners, anal or vaginal sex without condoms or medicines 
to prevent HIV, injecting hormones or drugs with shared 
syringes and other drug paraphernalia, commercial sex work, 
mental health issues, incarceration, homelessness, 
unemployment, and high levels of substance misuse 
compared to the general population, as well as violence and 
lack of family support.27 
This heightened incidence of HIV/AIDS in the transgender 
community is compounded by race: while the transgender population 
experiences HIV/AIDS at four times the rate of the general U.S. 
population,28 about “half of transgender people diagnosed with HIV 
are black/African American.”29 Accordingly, increased access to 
compassionate and comprehensive mental and physical health care is 
necessary to prevent, detect, and treat these and other health care 
issues afflicting a disproportionate percentage of the transgender 
community.30 
B.  Transition-Related Care as Treatment for Gender Dysphoria 
A subset of transgender people suffers from a related diagnosable 
emotional disorder that involves significant psychological distress and 
discomfort with one’s assigned sex. This condition was known as 
gender identity disorder (“GID”) under the fourth edition of the 
authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(“DSM-IV”) and is now called gender dysphoria in the recently-
published fifth edition (hereinafter “DSM-5”). The DSM-5 renamed 
the condition to acknowledge that, while transgender status is not itself 
a psychological disorder, the significant and pervasive psychological 
distress and discomfort that sometimes accompany one’s assigned sex 
 
 27. HIV Among Transgender People, supra note 25. 
 28. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY REPORT 
ON HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 13 (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 2010). 
 29. HIV Among Transgender People, supra note 25. 
 30. Id. 
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can be.31 The DSM-5 defines gender dysphoria as a diagnosis that 
involves “a difference between one’s experienced/expressed gender 
and assigned gender” together with “significant distress or problems 
functioning” related to that dissonance.32 The American Medical 
Association (“AMA”) and other medical care organizations have 
recognized GID as described in the DSM-IV (and now gender 
dysphoria, as described in the DSM-5) as a “serious medical 
condition.”33 Left untreated, gender dysphoria can result in “clinically 
significant psychological distress, dysfunction, debilitating depression 
and, for some people without access to appropriate medical care and 
treatment, suicidality and death.”34 
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(“WPATH”) is the leading professional organization devoted to the 
understanding and treatment of gender dysphoria.35 WPATH’s 
internationally accepted Standards of Care for the Health of 
Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People 
(hereinafter “WPATH Standards of Care” or “Standards of Care”) 
provide guidance on step-by-step treatment for gender dysphoria.36 
These steps typically begin with psychotherapy and other mental 
health care provided by a licensed psychotherapist or other health care 
professional.37 They continue with various types of support for 
“[c]hanges in gender expression and role,”38 such as change of name, 
dress, hair, voice and communication style.39 In some cases, next steps 
may include, when appropriate, “hormone therapy to feminize or 
masculinize the body”40 and/or gender conformity surgery (that is, 
 
 31. Wayne Parry, Gender Dysphoria: DSM-5 Reflects Shift in Perspective on Gender Identity, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/gender-
dysphoria-dsm-5_n_3385287.html. 
 32. What is Gender Dysphoria?, supra note 11 (emphasis added). 
 33. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 122 (A-08) REMOVING FINANCIAL 
BARRIERS TO CARE FOR TRANSGENDER PATIENTS (2008), http://www.tgender.net/taw/ama_resol 
utions.pdf. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE 
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCOMFORMING PEOPLE 9–10, 21–
63 (7th ed. 2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/amo_hub_content/Association140/files/Standards%2 
0of%20Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH%20(2)(1).pdf. 
 37. Id. at 10, 21–33. 
 38. Id. at 9. These changes “may involve living part time or full time in another gender role, 
consistent with one’s identity”. Id. at 52–54. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Id. 
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“[s]urgery to change primary and/or secondary sex characteristics”).41 
The Standards of Care require the recommendation of one or more 
licensed psychotherapists depending on the type of surgery (one 
psychotherapist’s recommendation for “breast/chest surgery” and two 
for “genital surgery,” for instance).42 
The Standards of Care and their underlying principles are now 
recognized by major medical associations such as the AMA, APA, and 
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (“ACOG”).  
Specifically, the AMA issued the following policy statement:  
Our AMA (1) recognizes that medical and surgical 
treatments for gender dysphoria, as determined by shared 
decision making between the patient and physician, are 
medically necessary as outlined by generally-accepted 
standards of medical and surgical practice; and (2) will 
advocate for federal, state, and local policies to provide 
medically necessary care for gender dysphoria.43 
Likewise, the APA issued a resolution in which it acknowledged the 
WPATH Standards of Care and stated both that it “supports the 
provision of adequate and necessary mental and medical health care 
treatment for transgender and gender variant individuals” and that it 
“recognizes the efficacy, benefit and medical necessity of gender 
transition treatments for appropriately evaluated individuals and calls 
upon public and private insurers to cover these medically necessary 
treatments.”44 In a third example of such policy language, the ACOG 
acknowledged the wide use of the WPATH Standards of Care, 
described the steps of the Standards of Care in detail, and stated, 
“[O]bstetrician-gynecologists should be prepared to assist or refer 
transgender individuals for routine treatment and screening as well as 
hormonal and surgical therapies.”45 The ACOG went on to urge 
“public and private health insurance plans to cover the treatment of 
gender identity disorder.”46 
 
 41. Id. at 10, 54–64. 
 42. Id. at 27, 59–60. 
 43. Clarification of Medical Necessity for Treatment of Gender Dysphoria H-185.927, AM. 
MED. ASS’N, https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/gender%20dysphoria?uri=%2F 
AMADoc%2FHOD-185.927.xml (last updated 2016) (hereinafter “AMA Policy”). 
 44. Transgender, Gender Identity, & Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/about/policy/transgender.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 45. ACOG Policy, supra note 19, at 1455–56. 
 46. Id. at 1455. 
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In all three of the foregoing policies, prominent medical 
organizations have (a) recognized the medical propriety and necessity, 
in line with physician recommendations and generally accepted care 
practices, of treatments for gender dysphoria, and (b) advocated for 
federal, state, and local policies to ensure coverage of such health care 
under both public and private insurance. Notably, the AMA and 
ACOG language specifically points to surgery (i.e., gender conformity 
surgery) as an appropriate path to treatment, and the APA and ACOG 
specifically acknowledge the WPATH Standards of Care.47 However, 
despite near-universal acceptance in the medical community of gender 
dysphoria as a formal diagnosis and of the WPATH Standards of Care 
as the appropriate treatment for gender dysphoria, transgender people 
often experience difficulty receiving appropriate medical care, 
obtaining the psychotherapy, hormone treatment, and surgery they 
need, and/or securing insurance coverage for the care they do receive. 
C.  Discrimination and Lack of Awareness as  
Obstacles to Accessing Adequate Medical Care 
The difficulties that transgender people encounter accessing 
appropriate medical care stem from a number of factors. Transgender 
and gender-nonconforming survey participants report “very high 
levels of postponing medical care when they are sick or injured due to 
discrimination (28%) or inability to afford [care] (48%).”48 Twenty-
eight percent reported being subjected to harassment in medical 
settings,49 and according to a 2015 survey, “[o]ne in four (25%) 
respondents experienced a problem in the past year with their 
insurance related to being transgender, such as being denied coverage 
for care related to gender transition or being denied coverage for 
routine care because they were transgender.”50 
Because the U.S. Census Bureau has never collected data 
regarding transgender status or other matters related to gender identity 
and has canceled preliminary plans to do so in the 2020 census, 
independent studies such as those cited in this paper are the primary 
 
 47. See AMA Policy, supra note 43; ACOG Policy, supra note 19; Transgender, Gender 
Identity, & Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, supra note 44. 
 48. Grant, supra note 28, at 1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Dec. 2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS 
-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf. 
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sources of statistical information regarding transgender and gender 
nonconforming people.51 Despite the fact that “more than 75 members 
of Congress” and various federal agencies requested that data on 
“sexual orientation and gender identity” be collected, the then-director 
of the Census Bureau, John Thompson, wrote in March 2017 that the 
Bureau had “concluded there was no federal data need” for such 
information.52 Significantly, in its report entitled, “Subjects Planned 
for the 2020 Census and American Community Survey,” the Bureau 
revealed that, even as it rejected suggestions to collect information 
about gender identity, it planned to continue to seek information about 
gender.53 It stated, “A question about the gender of each person is used 
to create statistics about males and females and to present other data, 
such as occupation, by gender,” and clarified that the only two choices 
for “gender” would be “male” or “female.”54 It went on to explain the 
purpose of collecting male/female data: 
Gender data are used in planning and funding government 
programs and in evaluating other government programs and 
policies to ensure they fairly and equitably serve the needs of 
males and females. These statistics are also used to enforce 
laws, regulations, and policies against discrimination in 
government programs and in society. 
 . . .  
Knowing the gender of people in the community in 
combination with information about housing, voting, 
 
 51. See Hansi L. Wang, Collecting LGBT Census Data is ‘Essential’ to Federal Agency, 
Document Shows, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/20/53354201 
4/collecting-lgbt-census-data-is-essential-to-federal-agency-document-shows; see also Stephen 
Dinan, President Trump Cancels Sexual Orientation Questions on 2020 Census, WASH. TIMES 
(Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/28/trump-cancels-census-
sexual-orientation-questions-/?utmsource=RSS_Feedutm_medium=RSS  
(“The Trump administration canceled plans to probe Americans for their sexual orientation in the 
2020 Census, nixing efforts by congressional Democrats who’d wanted a better picture of the 
country’s increasingly complex family and sexual dynamics.”). 
 52. John W. Thompson, Director’s Blog: Planned Subjects for the 2020 Census and the 
American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: CENSUS BLOGS (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2017/03/planned_subjects_2020.html 
(defending decision to remove gender identity and sexual orientation from list of 2020 Census 
topics). 
 53. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SUBJECTS PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS AND AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY: FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE AND PROGRAM USES 9 (Mar. 2017), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/operations/planned-subjects-2020-
acs.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
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language, employment, and education, helps government and 
communities enforce laws, regulations, and policies against 
discrimination on the basis of gender.  
 . . .  
Knowing whether people of different genders have the same 
opportunities in education, employment, voting, home 
ownership, and many other areas is of interest to researchers, 
advocacy groups, and policymakers. For example, . . . 
several agencies use gender data to investigate whether 
women, including women who are military veterans, have 
similar employment opportunities as men.55 
The same report identified numerous other areas of inquiry, including 
“health insurance,” and explained the purpose of that line of inquiry: 
Knowing the health insurance coverage status of people in a 
community helps planners identify gaps in community 
services, plan programs that address those gaps, and qualify 
for funding for those programs. 
Knowing more about changes in health insurance coverage 
rates and the characteristics of people who have or do not 
have health insurance is also of interest to researchers, 
advocacy groups, and policymakers.56 
Gathering the same types of information about gender identity would 
serve the same commendable purposes for the transgender population, 
and it would provide similar valuable information about whether 
transgender individuals are being “fairly and equitably” treated—or 
discriminated against—in a variety of spheres, such as employment, 
health insurance, and access to medical care. Yet, as of March 2017, 
the U.S. Census Bureau had determined not to collect data on the 
American transgender population and its specific needs.57 
Although data on the difficulties experienced by the transgender 
population in accessing health care is limited, anecdotally, at least 
some cases of health care denial stem from a lack of training and 
awareness related to transgender medical care among the medical 
community, leaving many physicians unaware of, for instance, the 
need for pap smears, breast exams, mammograms, and prostate 
 
 55. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 33. 
 57. Id.; Thompson, supra note 52. 
[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:17 PM 
16 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51: 1 
screenings in transgender women.58 Specifically, half of transgender 
patients surveyed “reported having to teach their medical providers 
about transgender [health] care.”59 Accordingly, anti-discrimination 
protections and adequate education regarding proper treatment of 
transgender patients would improve the availability and quality of 
transition- and wellness-related care for transgender people, as would 
financial safeguards.60 As stated above, up to half of transgender 
people report inability to afford health care as a primary reason for 
postponing medical care.61 Thus, from a purely financial perspective, 
equity in both health care insurance coverage and tax deductibility for 
transgender health care costs would help ensure that adequate health 
care is also affordable for transgender patients. 
II.  FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS GOVERNING TRANSGENDER 
HEALTH CARE 
Health care affordability is a common obstacle to health care 
among transgender people. Specifically, in two different studies, 
thirty-three percent62 and forty-eight percent63 of transgender patients 
reported delaying or foregoing medical treatment due to their inability 
to afford care. One major reason for this lack of affordability is high 
out-of-pocket costs that are not covered by insurance.64 About twenty 
percent of all transgender people (and more than thirty percent of 
African American transgender people) do not have health insurance at 
all,65 as compared to 8.8% in the population at large.66 Figures 1, 2, 
and 3 show the respective percentages of transgender men, women, 
and African-Americans who are privately insured, publicly insured, 
and uninsured. 
 
 58. Abby Ellin, Transgender Patients Face Challenges at the Hospital, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2016, 2:59 AM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/02/16/for-transgender-patients-challenges-
at-the-hospital. 
 59. Grant, supra note 28, at 1. 
 60. Id.; Ellin, supra note 58. 
 61. Grant, supra note 28, at 1. 
 62. James, supra note 50, at 8. 
 63. Grant, supra note 28, at 1. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 8. 
 66. JESSICA C. BARNETT & EDWARD R. BERCHICK, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2016 3 (U.S. Census Bureau 2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Censu 
s/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-260.pdf (reporting that “[i]n 2016, 8.8 percent of people . . . 
were uninsured for the entire calendar year,” while “[t]he uninsured rates for Blacks” was 10.5 
percent). 
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 67. Grant, supra note 28, at 8. 
 68. Id. 
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High unemployment and poverty rates among the transgender 
population, as well as lesser likelihoods of obtaining health insurance 
through their employer, all contribute to this disparity.70 Among 
uninsured transgender people, reported rates of “delaying care due to 
inability to afford it” are especially high: eighty-six percent for overall 
health care, and eighty-eight percent for preventative health care.71 As 
discussed in more detail below, even among those who are insured, 
the availability of coverage for medical care associated with gender 
conformity surgery, hormone therapy, and other care recommended 
by the WPATH Standards of Care varies depending both on the type 
of health insurance a person has—Medicare, Medicaid, private 
insurance, or otherwise—as well as on the varying laws governing 
insurance in the person’s state or geographical region. 
A.  Uncertainty of Federal Protections under  
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act 
Medicare is a federal health insurance program that provides 
health insurance for older Americans and people with disabilities.72 
Medicare is administered by the federal government and coverage 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Barnett, supra note 66, at 3. 
 71. Grant, supra note 28, at 7. 
 72. What is the difference between Medicare and Medicaid?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/what -is-the-difference-
between-medicare-medicaid/index.html (last visited April 4, 2018). 
[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:17 PM 
2018] PROTECTING TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE 19 
does not change from state to state. Meanwhile, each of the fifty states 
administer their own system for Medicaid, which provides health 
insurance to low-income Americans and can vary greatly between 
states.73 Private health insurance coverage can also differ depending 
on the requirements of a combination of broad federal guidelines and 
specific state laws. This section addresses the role of federal 
legislation in protecting transgender health care insurance coverage 
under these three types of insurance plans. 
Medicare, a purely federal program, is administered by the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).74 From 1989 to 
May 2014, HHS prohibited Medicare from covering gender 
conformity surgery,75 and many states did (and still do) prohibit such 
coverage under their Medicaid programs.76 In 2014, however, the 
federal policy changed; an HHS Departmental Appeals Board 
eliminated this categorical exclusion for coverage of transgender 
surgery under Medicare, explaining that the classification of—and 
resulting prohibition of coverage for—all transition-related treatment 
as “cosmetic” or “experimental” is “outdated and not based on current 
standards of care.”77 However, because Medicaid is administered by 
the states, the HHS Appeals Board Decision directly controlled only 
Medicare coverage and did not effect a universal policy change to 
protect transgender people under state Medicaid systems. 
Then, in May 2016, pursuant to its authority under the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”), HHS promulgated a final rule that clarified that 
the ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination extends to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of transgender status (among other 
prohibited grounds) by all “health insurers receiving Federal financial 
assistance [including state Medicaid programs], hospitals, clinics and 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. How is Medicare funded? MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-
medicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited April 4, 2018). 
 75. Medicare Program: National Coverage Decisions, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,555, 34,572 (Aug. 21, 
1989) (deeming “transsexual surgery for sex reassignment” to be “controversial,” unsupported by 
“well controlled, long-term studies of the safety and effectiveness,” “experimental,” and plagued 
by “a high rate of serious complications,” and deciding therefore that “transsexual surgery is not 
covered” by Medicare); Know Your Rights | Medicare, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 
(2018), http://www.transequality.org/know-your-rights/medicare. 
      76.   See infra, text accompanying note 111. 
 77. NCD 140.3 Transsexual Surgery, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEPARTMENTAL 
APPEALS BD., APP. DIV. 1, 12, 21-24 (May 30, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static 
/dab/decisions/board-decisions/2014/dab2576.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2018); see Know Your 
Rights | Medicare, supra note 75. 
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other health facilities, HHS health programs [such as Medicare] and 
activities . . . .”78 The final rule is codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations at 42 C.F.R. part 92 and is entitled, “Nondiscrimination 
on the Basis of Race, Color, National Origin, Sex, Age, or Disability 
in Health Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial 
Assistance and Health Programs or Activities Administered by the 
Department of Health and Human Services or Entities Established 
under Title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.”79 The 
regulation is based on HHS’s interpretation of section 1557 of the 
ACA, which states that “an individual shall not . . . be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which 
is receiving Federal financial assistance, including . . . contracts of 
insurance . . .” on numerous grounds, including any “ground 
prohibited under . . . title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972 . . . ,”80 which in turn prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
“sex.”81  Subject to certain exceptions, the rule became effective July 
18, 2016.82 
With the May 2016 rule, HHS clarified that Section 1557’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination in health insurance by any insurer 
that receives funding from HHS or that is otherwise subject to Section 
1557 of the ACA includes discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity and transgender status. The rule amended the definition of 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include “discrimination on the 
basis of . . . gender identity,” which it in turn defined to include 
 
 78. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375,31376, 
31375,31454-55 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). The rule specifically excludes 
Medicare Part B but includes “[s]tate Medicaid agencies receiving Federal financial assistance.” 
Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,445. 
 79. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b) (2016). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). Section 1557’s prohibition on “discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability” applies to “[a]ny health program or activity,” 
including state Medicaid programs and private health insurers, “any part of which received funding 
from HHS” or “that HHS itself administers,” as well as “Health Insurance Marketplaces and all 
plans offered by issuers that participate in those Marketplaces.” Office for Civil Rights, Section 
1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
(July 30, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section 1557/index.html. 
 81. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 82. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375,31376, 
31375,31473 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 92.4) (“to the extent that provisions of 
this rule require[d] changes to health insurance or group health plan benefit design,” the rule 
became effective for plan years “beginning on or after January 1, 2017.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
18116(a) (2012). 
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“transgender individual[s].”83 In short, HHS clarified that state 
Medicaid programs and private insurers may not discriminate against 
transgender individuals. In support of its rulemaking, HHS referenced 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,84 in 
which the Court held that discrimination on the basis of “stereotypical 
notions of appropriate behavior, appearance or mannerisms for each 
gender constitutes sex discrimination.”85 As HHS pointed out, “in 
prohibiting sex discrimination, Congress intended to strike at the 
entire spectrum of discrimination against men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.”86 Numerous lower federal courts have applied 
the same reasoning to hold that discrimination against a person based 
on his or her transgender status amounts to unlawful sex 
discrimination. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit in Glenn v. Brumby87 considered the claim of a 
transgender individual who was diagnosed with GID and who was 
terminated from his employment shortly after beginning the process 
of gender transition.88 The court unequivocally held that 
“discrimination against a transgender individual because of her 
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as 
being on the basis of sex or gender.”89 While the Price Waterhouse 
Court, the Glenn court, and many other federal courts were 
interpreting the sex discrimination prohibition under Title VII, as HHS 
pointed out, “courts frequently look to case law interpreting other civil 
rights provisions, including Title VII, for guidance in interpreting Title 
IX,”90 and, accordingly, those cases all support HHS’s decision to 
extend Title IX’s—and the ACA’s—prohibition on sex discrimination 
 
 83. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2017); see also Office for Civil Rights, Nondiscrimination in Health 
Programs and Activities Proposed Rule: Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/nondis 
crimination-health-programs-and-activities-proposed-rule/index.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2015). 
     84.   490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
 85. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375,31376, 
31375,31387-88 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51). 
 86. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31375,31389. 
      87.   663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 88. Id. at 1314. 
 89. Id. at 1317 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198–1203 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosa 
v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 
F.3d 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2004); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F.App’x. 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 90. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31375,31376, 
31375,31389. 
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to encompass and prohibit discrimination against transgender 
individuals as well. 
Despite ample statutory and case law support for the HHS 
regulation, in August 2016, a group of states and religiously-affiliated 
health care organizations filed a lawsuit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas against HHS and the Secretary 
of HHS, challenging the HHS regulation’s prohibition on 
discrimination by health care providers and insurers on the basis of 
transgender status, as well as another amendment prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of termination of pregnancy.91 The 
plaintiffs in Franciscan Alliance, Inc. argued that the amended 
regulation “pressures doctors to deliver healthcare in a manner that 
violates their religious freedom and thwarts their independent medical 
judgment.”92 HHS defended its interpretation of section 1557 by 
explaining that the regulatory amendment “does not mandate any 
particular procedure” but rather “requires only that covered entities 
provide nondiscriminatory health services and health insurance in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.”93 Specifically, the “discriminatory 
actions” that HHS intended to prevent included “[h]av[ing] or 
implement[ing] a categorical coverage exclusion or limitation for all 
health services related to gender transition.”94 In other words, covered 
entities would be prohibited from denying coverage for transition-
related treatment solely on the basis that such treatment is transition-
related. 
On December 31, 2016, the District Court issued its opinion in 
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell and held that HHS’s 
interpretation of “sex discrimination” was arbitrary and capricious 
insofar as it failed to include an exemption for religious organizations 
that are opposed to abortion and gender transition.95 The court 
 
 91. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell (Burwell I), 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
The lawsuit also challenged a related amendment to the same regulation that clarified that the 
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of termination 
of a pregnancy. See id. The original plaintiffs included Nebraska, Kentucky, Kansas, Texas, and 
Wisconsin. See Complaint at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016) (ECF No. 1). In October 2016, Louisiana, Arizona, and Mississippi joined as plaintiffs. 
See First Amended Complaint at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016) (ECF No. 21). 
 92. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 671–72. 
 93. Id. at 672. 
 94. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b) (2016)). 
 95. Id. at 692. 
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imposed a nationwide injunction barring the enforcement of HHS’s 
regulation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity 
and termination of pregnancy.96 Seeking to support the 
implementation of HHS’s regulation, the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the River City Gender Alliance (collectively, the “ACLU”) 
filed a motion to intervene in the case on HHS’s behalf on September 
16, 2016, and another motion to stay the injunction on January 9, 
2017.97 While not allowing the ACLU to formally intervene, the court 
allowed the ACLU to participate as amici curiae.98 The court denied 
the ACLU’s motion to stay the injunction on January 24, 2017, leaving 
the injunction in place.99 Next, on May 2, 2017, HHS moved the court 
to stay the litigation and remand the matter to HHS to give it the 
opportunity to reassess its regulation and potentially conduct a new 
rulemaking proceeding.100 In its motion, made under the new 
presidential administration, HHS represented a willingness to 
reconsider the regulation, stating that: 
[n]ew leadership at HHS has now had time to scrutinize the 
two aspects of the Rule at issue in this case and has concerns 
as to the need for, reasonableness, and burden imposed by 
those parts of the Rule. HHS takes the concerns of the Court 
seriously and should be given the opportunity to initiate 
rulemaking proceedings to reconsider the Rule.101 
 
 96. Id. at 695. 
 97. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene of River City Gender Alliance 
and ACLU of Texas, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O (N.D. Tex. Sep. 
16, 2016), ECF No. 8; Proposed Intervenors’ Motion for Ruling on Intervention and Stay of 
Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O 
(N.D. Tex. Jan 9, 2017), ECF No. 63; see Matthew Loughran, ACLU to Appeal Court’s Block of 
Transgender Nondiscrimination Rule, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/aclu-appeal-courts-n73014449745.  
 98. The motion to intervene has had a somewhat convoluted history. Technically, the ACLU 
moved both for intervention as of right and for permissive intervention. The court denied the 
ACLU’s motion to intervention as of right, and delayed ruling on permissive intervention pending 
briefing by the other parties. In the meantime, the ACLU appealed the former ruling to the Fifth 
Circuit, and the district court determined that it should not consider the latter in light of the appeal. 
See Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108-O, 2017 WL 3616652, at *1–3, *nn. 4–
7 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2017). 
 99. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell (Burwell II), No. 7:16-CV-00108-O, 2017 WL 
2964088, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017). 
 100. Defendant’s Motion for Voluntary Remand and Stay at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. 
Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O  (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2017), ECF No. 92. 
 101. Id. at 3 
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The court granted HHS’s motion on July 10, 2017, and entered an 
order staying the case indefinitely while leaving the injunction in 
effect and the court has been requiring HHS to file periodic status 
reports on the progress of HHS’s rulemaking in the meantime.102 For 
nine months, HHS reported the same news in multiple status reports, 
namely that, under the new presidential administration, “[a] draft of a 
proposed rule is going through the clearance process within the 
Executive Branch,” and that the proposed rule will then go through 
“an inter-agency clearance process managed by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB”)” and the usual “rulemaking 
proceedings” with public “notice and comment” opportunities,103 all 
of which could take several years and may well ultimately result in an 
agency repeal of the explicit prohibition on transgender 
discrimination. Finally, in its April 2018 status report to the court, 
HHS revealed that it had submitted its proposed revised rule to OMB 
for “inter-agency clearance as required by Executive Order 12,866,” 
and that the proposed rule “will not be publicly available until after 
the E.O. 12,866 process is complete,” but it did not reveal any of the 
content of the proposed revision or hint about the nature of the 
revisions.104 
The district court’s refusal to date to enforce the prohibition on 
discrimination on the basis of transgender status (and HHS’s 
willingness to reconsider that prohibition) contradicts the line of 
federal court cases arising from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
discussed above, as well as an administrative decision, Macy v. 
Holder,105 in which the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission concluded that, in the employment context, 
“discrimination against a transgender individual because that person 
is transgender is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’” 
 
 102. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108-O, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5 (N.D. 
Tex. July 10, 2017). 
 103. Defendant’s Status Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-
O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2017), ECF No. 106; Defendant’s Status Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance, 
Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017), ECF No. 109; Defendant’s Status 
Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2017), 
ECF No. 110; Defendant’s Status Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Azar, No. 7:16-CV-
00108-O (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018), ECF No. 111. 
 104. See Defendant’s Status Report at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Azar, No. 7:16-CV-00108-
O (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2018), ECF No. 113. 
 105. No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012). 
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and hence prohibited under Title VII.106 Yet the Franciscan Alliance, 
Inc. decision will stand unless and until an appellate court reverses or 
stays the injunction, or until HHS promulgates a revised regulation 
and thereby inspires the district court to lift its injunction. For now, 
the injunction prevents the enforcement against state Medicaid 
programs and private insurers of HHS regulations that prohibit 
discrimination in the context of health insurance against transgender 
and gender nonconforming people.107 Although the injunction may 
limit HHS’s ability to investigate and respond to discrimination 
against transgender patients the injunction does not affect HHS’s 
decision to cover gender conformity surgery and hormone therapy 
under Medicare for elderly Americans and Americans with 
disabilities. Nor does it affect coverage in the numerous states where 
state law explicitly requires that Medicaid and/or private insurers must 
cover these procedures, as discussed in more detail in the next 
section.108 However, the injunction might affect the rate at which 
remaining states adopt explicit coverage protections.109 
B.  State Law Protections Governing  
Private Insurance and Medicaid 
State insurance law governs what health insurance providers must 
cover under state Medicaid programs and private health insurance 
plans.110 A growing number of state legislatures have adopted some 
form of insurance safeguards for transgender people. As of January 
22, 2018, the insurance laws of nineteen states and the District of 
Columbia prohibit private insurers from excluding transgender health 
care coverage; those states are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
 
 106. Id. at *11. 
 107. See Burwell I, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 695; see also George B. Breen & Jonathan K. Hoerner, 
Court Issues Nationwide Injunction Prohibiting Enforcement of Section 1557 Provisions Relating 
to Gender Identity and Termination of Pregnancy—But Other Provisions Still Can Be Enforced, 
HEALTH L. ADVISOR (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/2017/01/09/court-issues-
nationwide-injunction-prohibiting-enforcement-of-section-1557-provisions-relating-to-gender-
identity-and-termination-of-pregnancy-but-other-provisions-still-can-be-enforced/. 
 108. Georgia Burke, Injunction Puts Focus on Need to Keep 1557 Protections, JUST. IN AGING 
(Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.justiceinaging.org/injunction-limits-health-care-protections-transgende 
r-individuals. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19)). State 
insurance law also governs requirements for state employee health care insurance coverage. 
However, this paper focuses on insurance coverage requirements for non-state employees. 
[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:17 PM 
26 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51: 1 
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.111 Twelve of 
those nineteen states and the District of Columbia also more generally 
prohibit private health insurance discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity; New Jersey prohibits health insurance 
discrimination based only on sexual orientation, not gender identity.112 
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of these legal protections among 
the various states. 
 




Notably, some of the nineteen states that require private insurers 
to cover transgender health care do not explicitly provide this same 
coverage under their Medicaid programs.114 Yet Medicaid patients in 
the District of Columbia and the following eighteen states are 
explicitly protected under state policy to receive coverage for 
transgender health care: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.115 The list of states that have 
 
 111. Healthcare Laws and Policies: Table Format, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last updated Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Healthcare Laws and Policies: Private Insurance, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies  
(last updated Apr. 13, 2018). 
 114. Id. Specifically, Delaware and Michigan have explicit transgender non-discrimination 
protections under private insurance plans, but both states are silent on whether transgender non-
discrimination rules apply under Medicaid. 
 115. Id. 
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adopted laws to protect transgender access to healthcare has continued 
to change and grow; please visit the Movement Advancement Project 
website for the most recent updated list.116 Figure 5 illustrates these 
differences in Medicaid coverage in the various states. 
 




The state laws providing explicit protections for transgender 
patients under private insurance and/or Medicaid have a common 
theme: the threshold that the covered treatments are “medically 
necessary.” For instance, California’s insurance statutes and 
regulations generally require health insurance providers to cover 
medically necessary basic health care services and pharmaceuticals118 
and permit them to deny coverage on the basis that a procedure is not 
“medically necessary.”119 Section 2561.2 of Title 10 of the California 
Code of Regulations prohibits transgender discrimination by insurers 
as follows: 
An admitted insurer shall not, in connection with health 
insurance as defined in subdivision (b) of Insurance Code 
section 106, discriminate on the basis of an insured’s or 
prospective insured’s actual or perceived gender identity, or 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Healthcare Laws and Policies: Medicaid, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last updated Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.005 (West 2017); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, §§ 
1300.67.24, 1300.71.4 (2018); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.193(c) (West 2018). 
 119. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10112.27, 10123.7, 10123.135, 10123.201 (West 2018); 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 511 (West 1997); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2562.2, 2699.300, 
2699.301, 2699.6203 (West 2017). 
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on the basis that the insured or prospective insured is a 
transgender person.120 
The statute goes on to list a number of prohibited forms of 
discrimination, including “[d]enying, cancelling, [or] limiting” health 
insurance coverage “on the basis of an insured’s or prospective 
insured’s actual or perceived gender identity or” their status as a 
“transgender person” and “[d]enying or limiting coverage” for 
transition-related and non-transition-related health care services on the 
basis of gender identity.121 Section 2561.2 concludes by stating: “This 
Section . . . shall have no bearing on the question of whether or not a 
particular health care service is medically necessary in any individual 
case.”122 Accordingly, although insurers may not discriminate on the 
basis of transgender status in providing health insurance coverage, 
they may attempt to deny coverage for gender conformity surgery and 
other transition-related care on the basis of medical necessity and 
follow the procedures set up by California law for challenging medical 
necessity.123 In addition, the guidance for Medi-Cal benefits 
(California’s version of Medicaid) specifically states that “[t]reatment 
for Gender Identity Disorder (GID) is a covered Medi-Cal benefit 
when medical necessity has been demonstrated.”124 
Likewise, Oregon’s regulations—which are modeled after 
California Code of Regulations Title 10 § 2561—include similar 
language creating the same ban on transgender discrimination bundled 
with the same “medically necessary” caveat when describing the 
requirements for private insurers to cover treatments for gender 
dysphoria.125 The relevant Oregon statute states: 
An individual may not, on the basis of actual or perceived . . . 
gender identity . . . be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of or otherwise be subjected to 
discrimination by any health benefit plan issued or delivered 
in this state, in the receipt of medical assistance . . . or in the 
 
 120. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2561.2 (2017). 
 121. Id. §§ 2561.2(a)(1), 2561.2(a)(4). 
 122. Id. (emphasis added). 
 123. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.68 (West 2018). 
 124. Medi-Cal Update, MEDI-CAL (Mar. 2013), http://files.medi-cal.ca.gov/pubsdoco/bulletin 
s/artfull/gm201303.asp#a21 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (emphasis added). 
 125. KATE BROWN, OREGON DIVISION OF FINANCIAL REGULATION BULLETIN DFR 2016-1 
1(2012), https://dfr.oregon.gov/laws-rules/Documents/Bulletins/bulletin2016-01.pdf. 
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coverage of or payment for the services, drugs, devices, 
products and procedures . . . .126 
Elsewhere in the Oregon statutes however, as in California, insurers 
are given the authority to deny coverage on the basis of “medical 
necessity;” presumably, then transgender services may be denied on 
the basis of lack of medical necessity.127 Finally, as in California, 
Oregon’s version of Medicaid, the Oregon Health Plan, covers 
treatment for gender dysphoria, including hormone therapy and sex 
reassignment surgery.128 
Consequently, in California, Oregon, and other states that have 
adopted prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of transgender 
status in the context of insurance, the meaning and interpretation of 
the term “medical necessity” are crucial to whether insured patients 
actually receive coverage for their treatment. Yet there is no federal 
statutory language—and, often, no state statutory language—to define 
“medical necessity.”129 Medical necessity, as defined by 
Medicare.gov, describes “Health care services or supplies needed to 
diagnose or treat an illness, injury, condition, disease, or its symptoms 
and that meet accepted standards of medicine.”130 Explicit definitions 
(where they exist) typically incorporate, at minimum, the two-pronged 
requirement that “medically necessary” health care must involve 
services or supplies that (1) evaluate or treat an illness or other 
condition, as well as (2) align with applicable medical standards.131 
However, the determination whether specific treatments are 
 
 126. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.875 (2017). 
 127. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 743B.001, 743B.225, 743B.252, 743B.256, 743B.281, 
743B.282, 743B.420, 743B.422, 743B.423 (2017). 
 128. Prioritized List: Guideline for Gender Dysphoria: Frequently Asked Questions, OR. 
HEALTH AUTHORITY (Oct. 2015), http://www.oregon.gov/OHA/HPA/CSI-HERC/FactSheets/Gen 
der-dysphoria.pdf. 
 129. See, eg., Thie v. Davis, 688 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting “the absence of 
a definition of medical necessity”). 
 130. Glossary–M, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov 
/glossary/m.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (emphasis added). 
 131. See Policy 8: Definition and Application of Medical Necessity, AM. COLL. OF MED. 
QUALITY, http://www.acmq.org/policies/policy8.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“Medical 
necessity is defined as accepted health care services and supplies provided by health care entities, 
appropriate to the evaluation and treatment of a disease, condition, illness or injury and consistent 
with the applicable standard of care.”) (emphasis added); see also, Medical Necessity Definitions, 
CIGNA, https://www.cigna.com/healthcare-professionals/resources-for-health-care-professionals/ 
clinical-payment-and-reimbursement-policies/medical-necessity-definitions (last visited Feb. 18, 
2018) (“‘Medically Necessary’ . . . shall mean health care services . . . for the purpose of 
evaluating, diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms, and that are . . . in 
accordance with the generally accepted standards of medical practice . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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“medically necessary,” if not explicitly addressed via state statute, can 
remain unclear.132 
Some argue that gender conformity surgery and other transition-
related procedures are “medically necessary” and must therefore be 
covered under all state Medicaid plans, in accordance with guidelines 
for “general medical necessity” (which is determined by state 
legislature and relies on the consensus of the medical community) and 
“specific medical necessity” (which relies on the judgment of the 
specific patient’s physician).133 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 
opinion in Beal v. Doe,134 wrote that “serious statutory questions might 
be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical 
treatment from its coverage.”135 However, the “Federal Medicaid Act 
does not explicitly require states to cover all medically necessary 
treatment.”136 Therefore, the argument that transition-related 
procedures are “medically necessary” merely opens state Medicaid 
statutes up for debate. 
In addition to disparities in coverage under Medicaid, coverage, 
even for “medically necessary” treatments, can vary greatly depending 
on the patient’s specific health insurance plan.137 Although the widely-
accepted WPATH Standards of Care recognize gender conformity 
surgery, hormone therapy, and other transition-related treatments as 
medically necessary,138 this language leaves room for ambiguity that 
may cause additional obstacles to coverage and therefore treatment, 
which this paper addresses in Section IV. 
Because federal regulations that prohibit discrimination by health 
insurers against transgender people are currently unenforceable due to 
 
 132. See, e.g., Choose the Right Plan, CAL. DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, 
https://www.dmhc.ca.gov/HealthCareinCalifornia/ChoosetheRightPlan.aspx#.Wg4ti7Q-et8 (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“A definition of what is medically necessary can be found in your health 
plan contract . . . .”). 
 133. Nicole M. True, Removing the Constraints to Coverage of Gender-Conforming Healthcare 
by State Medicaid Programs, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1329, 1343–44 (2012) (explaining general and 
specific necessities). 
    134.   432 U.S. 438 (1977).  
 135. Id. at 444. 
 136. True, supra note 133, at 1342. 
 137. See, e.g., Definition and Application of Medical Necessity, supra note 131 (“Preventive 
care may be Medically Necessary but coverage for Medically Necessary preventive care is 
governed by terms of the applicable Plan Documents.”) (emphasis added). 
 138. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 36, at 5 (“Medical 
treatment options include, for example, feminization or masculinization of the body through 
hormone therapy and/or surgery, which are effective in alleviating gender dysphoria and are 
medically necessary for many people.”) (emphasis added). 
[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:17 PM 
2018] PROTECTING TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE 31 
the Franciscan Alliance, Inc. Court’s nationwide injunction, state-
level legislation has become ever more important.139 As illustrated in 
Figure 4, thirty-seven states lack laws providing transgender-inclusive 
private insurance protections, and thirty-two states either have no 
explicit Medicaid policy (twenty-two) or explicitly exclude 
transgender health coverage (ten) under Medicaid.140 As indicated 
above, in those states without protective laws, transgender people who 
have insurance can find themselves denied coverage for transition-
related procedures and even basic health care; often, this is due to the 
use of binary gender categories (male or female) as a proxy for 
determining which gender-specific services are covered,141 or due to a 
health care provider’s failure to sufficiently show that a given 
treatment is “necessary” for a given patient.142 
Due to these inequalities in access to transgender-inclusive 
medical care, many transgender people incur vast out-of-pocket 
expenses for both transgender health-related health care services 
including gender conformity surgery and hormone therapy, as well as 
potentially even basic medical procedures.143 They may also be forced 
to travel long distances to find appropriate care providers, which can 
mean that even a patient who is insured might be denied coverage if 
the insurer considers a provider “out-of-network.”144 For all of these 
patients—those living in states that prohibit insurers from 
discriminating against transgender people but whose care is deemed 
“not medically necessary” and those in states without such 
prohibitions—the possibility of deducting medical expenses from 
taxable income (known as the “medical deduction”) is the only 
remaining federal protection providing any hope for financial relief 
for transition-related health care costs. The following section 
 
 139. Burwell I, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
 140. Healthcare Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (July 20, 2015), 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies. 
 141. Lisa Gillespie, Transgender People Still Denied Health Services Despite Affordable Care 
Act, PBS (July 23, 2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/transgender-people-
still-denied-health-services-despite-affordable-care-act. 
 142. Transgender Health Benefits in California, TRANSGENDER L. CTR. 3 (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-12-02-TLC-Health-Appeals-
Guide.pdf). 
 143. Liz Kowalczyk, In Mass., Transgender Patients Decry Hostility Over Medical Care, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/02/01/transgender-
people-say-hostility-ignorance-common-doctors-offices-emergency-
rooms/HYfNoCi2HAHw1QANBJnMJP/story.html. 
 144. Id. 
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describes the medical deduction and its applications within the realm 
of transgender health care. 
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL DEDUCTION AS IT PERTAINS TO 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE 
A.  Introduction to the Medical Deduction 
Since the passage of the United States Revenue Act of 1942, 
Americans have been entitled to deduct medical expenses from their 
taxable income, so long as they met the applicable threshold.145 That 
threshold was moved to 7.5% for tax year 1987, and then to 10% as of 
tax year 2013.146 After passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on 
December 22, 2017, the federal medical deduction threshold will be 
reduced back to 7.5% of the taxpayer’s Adjusted Gross Income 
(“AGI”) for tax years 2017 and 2018; after tax year 2018, the threshold 
for medical deductions will increase back to 10% of AGI.147 
Currently, about 30% of U.S. taxpayers file itemized federal tax 
returns.148 This number is expected to decrease starting in 2018, as the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act nearly doubles the standard deduction from 
$6,350 to $12,000 for single individuals and from $12,700 to $24,000 
for married couples filing jointly.149 Among these itemized returns, the 
medical and dental deduction accounted for $82,811,803 of the 
$1,206,705,085 (about 6.86%) estimated total itemized deductions 
claimed in 2014.150 Only a small percentage of U.S. taxpayers claim 
this tax benefit; in 2015, only about 8.8 million Americans claimed the 
medical deduction on their tax returns.151 In general, taxpayers who 
itemize their tax deductions “tend to be middle to upper income 
 
 145. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798. 
 146. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 868 (2010). 
 147. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11027, 131 Stat. 2044; see also 
Michelle Andrews, Bonus Tucked into GOP Tax Bill for Those Aiming to Deduct Medical 
Expenses, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 22, 2017), https://khn.org/news/bonus-tucked-into-gop-
tax-bill-for-those-aiming-to-deduct-medical-expenses. 
 148. SOI Tax Stats – Tax Stats at a Glance, IRS (2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-
tax-stats-at-a-glance. 
 149. Sarah O’Brien, GOP Tax Bill Expands Medical Expense Deduction for Two Years, CNBC 
(Dec. 16, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/16/gop-tax-bill-expands-medical-
expense-deduction-for-two-years.html. 
 150. John A. Koskinen et al., Individual Tax Returns Line Item Estimates, 2014, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14inlinecount.pdf (last updated Aug. 30, 2018). 
 151. Andrews, supra note 147. 
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taxpayers” in light of the level of expenditures necessary to exceed the 
standard deduction, and fewer of those taxpayers may incur 
unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed the threshold percentage, 
as compared to other deductions with no threshold such as taxes paid, 
mortgage interest, and charitable deductions.152 
Yet for those taxpayers who incur large out-of-pocket medical 
expenses that are not covered by health insurance, the medical 
deduction provides relief that is unavailable elsewhere. As described 
above, the transgender community continues to face immense out-of-
pocket expenses for both transition-related and routine medical care, 
due to a combination of discrimination, lack of insurance protections, 
and lack of knowledge of transgender health needs within the medical 
industry, and the question whether those expenses qualify for the 
medical deduction is therefore an important one for the community. 
Deductible costs can include many expenses associated with 
health care, including travel to and from medical appointments, 
prescription medications, and other out-of-pocket costs not covered by 
insurance or tax-preferred health savings accounts.153 Yet the 
determination whether a particular expense is a deductible medical 
expense is not always clear: issues arise regarding whether a particular 
expense is truly medically necessary, and not, for instance, associated 
with cosmetic surgery.154 
B.  Definition of “Medical Care” Under 
 Internal Revenue Code § 213 
Under section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, the term 
“medical care” means amounts paid “for the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of 
affecting any structure or function of the body.”155 Accordingly, the 
Code recognizes two categories of medical care expenses that can 
qualify as deductible: first, medical expenditures for the “diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” and, second, 
 
 152. Kelly Phillips Erb, Deduct This: The History of the Medical Expenses Deduction, FORBES 
(June 11, 2011, 8:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/06/20/deduct-this-
the-history-of-the-medical-expenses-deduction/#64be8311478c. 
 153. I.R.C. § 213(d) (2017). 
 154. See infra Section II.B. 
 155. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2017). 
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medical expenditures that “affect[] any structure or function of the 
body.”156 
The legislative and case history surrounding this statutory 
definition has first expanded, then subsequently narrowed, the 
definition of what qualifies as “medical care.” In 1981, the U.S. Tax 
Court applied the second category and decided that it was “broad 
enough to include hair transplant surgery . . . [performed] solely for 
cosmetic reasons”157 because such surgery “affected” a “structure” of 
the body insofar as it involved changing the structure of the scalp.158 
In response, in 1990, Congress amended the statute explicitly to 
exclude cosmetic surgery, defined below, in order to curtail the use of 
the medical deduction for elective cosmetic surgery.159 The amended 
statute reads: 
(213)(d)(9) Cosmetic surgery. 
(A) In general. – The term “medical care” does not include 
cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the 
surgery or procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity 
arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, 
a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or 
disfiguring disease. 
(B) Cosmetic surgery defined. – For purposes of this 
paragraph, the term “cosmetic surgery” means any procedure 
which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and 
does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the 
body or prevent or treat illness or disease.160 
Accordingly, in order for cosmetic surgery to qualify as medical care 
that qualifies for the medical deduction, it must satisfy one of the 
following conditions: 
1. Be “necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or 
directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Eric Smith & Ryan H. Pace, Deductible Cosmetic Surgery and the Treatment of 
Transgenderism: An Analysis of the Medical Expense Deduction Post-O’Donnabhain, AM. TAX’N 
ASS’N MIDYEAR MEETING: JLTR CONF. Feb. 2012, at 12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2003902. 
 158. Mattes v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 650, 653 (1981); Smith & Pace, supra note 157, at 12–13. 
 159. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9) (2017); Smith & Pace, supra note 157, at 14. 
 160. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9) (2017) (emphasis added). 
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injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring 
disease,”161 or 
2. “[M]eaningfully promote the proper function of the 
body,”162 or 
3. “[P]revent or treat illness or disease.”163 
Within the context of transition-related care, as discussed in more 
detail below, litigants have focused on the third option (the treatment 
of the symptoms of an illness, namely gender dysphoria) to argue that 
gender conformity surgery is deductible medical care, rather than non-
deductible cosmetic surgery. 
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) provides guidance on the 
interpretation and application of the various requirements of the 
Internal Revenue Code through numerous publications. One such 
publication, IRS Publication 502, provides guidance to taxpayers on 
the inclusion of certain expenses as medical expenses for the purposes 
of calculating their medical deduction.164 The Publication begins by 
defining “medical expenses” with language mirroring the statute: 
“Medical expenses are the costs of diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, and the costs for treatments 
affecting any part or function of the body.”165 It goes on to list 
examples of deductible expenses: “payments for legal medical 
services rendered by physicians, surgeons, dentists, and other medical 
practitioners” and “the costs of equipment, supplies, and diagnostic 
devices needed for these purposes.”166 The Publication then elaborates 
on these categories. Besides the obvious examples of medical care 
such as out-of-pocket payments to physicians for office visits and for 
surgeries to treat physical illnesses and injuries, the following 
categories might also be relevant to deductions for transition-related 
care: 
1. Deductions for Prescribed Medication: Taxpayers may deduct 
amounts paid to obtain prescription medications obtained in the 
 
 161. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2017). 
 162. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2017). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Pub. 502 (2017) Medical and Dental Expenses, IRS (2017), https://www.irs.gov/ 
publications/p502/ar02.html. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:17 PM 
36 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51: 1 
U.S.167 A taxpayer generally cannot include amounts paid to obtain 
non-prescription medications other than insulin.168 
2. Deductions for Mental Health-Related Medical Expenses: The 
cost of psychiatric care, psychoanalysis, and therapy for medical 
treatment may all be included in deductible medical expenses.169 A 
taxpayer may deduct legal fees paid that are “necessary to authorize 
treatment for mental illness.”170 However, a taxpayer cannot deduct as 
medical expenses legal fees for “the management of a guardianship 
estate, fees for conducting the affairs of the person being treated, or 
other fees” that are not directly necessary for medical care.171 
3. Deductions for Cosmetic Purposes: Publication 502 repeats and 
elaborates on the statutory exception for “unnecessary cosmetic 
surgery.”172 Generally, a taxpayer cannot include in medical expenses 
the amount one pays for elective cosmetic surgery, such as “facelifts, 
hair transplant surgery, hair removal (electrolysis), and 
liposuction.”173 The Publication states that a taxpayer, however, can 
deduct as medical expenses the amount paid for cosmetic surgery “if 
it is necessary to improve a deformity arising from, or directly related 
to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an 
accident or trauma, or a disfiguring disease.”174 For instance, a 
taxpayer may deduct amounts paid for breast reconstruction surgery 
following a mastectomy to treat breast cancer.175 Additionally, a 
taxpayer may deduct “the cost of a wig purchased upon the advice of 
a physician for the mental health of a patient who has lost all his or her 
hair from disease.”176 The Publication thereby presents an important 
distinction: Although a wig is not deductible if it merely serves to 
protect the mental health of a patient suffering from genetic hair loss, 
a wig is deductible if it is (a) recommended by a physician and (b) 
protects the mental health of a patient who has suffered hair loss from 
disease. It follows that cosmetic medical expenses are only deductible 
if recommended by a physician as treatment for symptoms related to 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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a specific disease. Significantly, Publication 502 is silent on the issue 
whether gender conformity surgery is a deductible medical expense or 
a non-deductible cosmetic surgery, and it has not been revised to 
explicitly address the issue, even in the wake of the O’Donnabhain 
decision discussed below. 
4. Other Deductions: According to Publication 502, a taxpayer 
can deduct “amounts paid for transportation primarily for, and 
essential to, medical care.”177 This includes mileage reimbursement at 
a rate of 17 cents per mile and airfare to and from medical 
treatments.178 Additionally, subject to certain restrictions outlined in 
the Publication, a taxpayer may also deduct out-of-pocket health 
insurance premiums and other costs for one’s own or a qualifying 
dependent’s health care services.179 Significantly, neither the Internal 
Revenue Code, nor the IRS’s implementing regulations, nor 
Publication 502 address medical necessity beyond the Publication’s 
passing reference to “unnecessary cosmetic surgery,”180 nor does the 
Publication identify medical necessity as a threshold requirement for 
deductibility. 
IV.  EFFECT OF O’DONNABHAIN V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE ON TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE TREATMENT UNDER TAX 
LAW 
A.  Case Background 
As discussed above, being transgender in the United States brings 
with it many financial, legal, and other challenges related to access to 
care beyond those typically faced by the population at large. In 
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,181 the United 
States Tax Court addressed the issue whether transition-related 
treatment costs qualify for the medical deduction, thereby offering a 
potential financial solution to transgender health care challenges.182 
Yet by reaching the unnecessary question whether transition-related 
treatments were medically necessary, the court created a double-edged 
sword: it lent credibility to the idea that transition-related treatments, 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
    181.   134 T.C. 34 (2010). 
 182. Id. at 35. 
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including those described by the WPATH Standards of Care, are 
medically necessary, which is surely helpful precedent for individuals 
contesting adverse insurance coverage determinations to the contrary. 
Yet it also potentially—and erroneously—creates precedent for 
imposing a heightened “medically necessary” threshold on medical 
tax deductions, making paying for transition-related treatments 
potentially harder to afford for an already marginalized population. 
The case arose when petitioner Rhiannon G. O’Donnabhain 
sought to deduct medical expenses associated with her treatment for 
GID (as it was then known) from her federal income taxes.183 In a 
controversial court decision, the United States Tax Court held that 
GID is a disease within the meaning of the tax code,184 and that the 
cost of hormone replacement therapy and sex reassignment surgery to 
treat O’Donnabhain’s GID were therefore deductible medical care 
(and not cosmetic surgery),185 but that her breast augmentation surgery 
was cosmetic in nature and therefore not deductible.186 The 
controversial majority opinion, joined by eight of the 16 Tax Court 
judges who heard the case, was accompanied by numerous concurring 
and dissenting opinions that, as one judge aptly noted, put the court 
“squarely . . . in the middle of a serious fight within the relevant 
scientific community, and the larger battle among those who are 
deeply concerned with the proper response to transsexual persons’ 
desires for extensive and expensive surgeries.”187 
The court described the facts of the case as follows: 
O’Donnabhain “was born a genetic male with unambiguous male 
genitalia” and assigned that gender at birth but, since childhood, felt 
“uncomfortable in the male gender role.”188 She began wearing 
“women’s clothing secretly around age ten.”189 Throughout her 
adolescence and into her adulthood, “[h]er discomfort . . . intensified, 
and she continued to dress in women’s clothing secretly.”190 In August 
 
 183. Id. at 42. 
 184. Id. at 59 (“we conclude that GID is a ‘disease’ within the meaning of section 213.”). 
 185. Id. at 70 (“We therefore conclude and hold that petitioner’s hormone therapy and sex 
reassignment surgery ‘treated . . . disease’ within the meaning of section 213(d)(9)(B) and 
accordingly are not ‘cosmetic surgery’ . . .”). 
 186. Id. at 73 (“[T]he breast augmentation surgery is ‘cosmetic surgery’ that is excluded from 
deductible ‘medical care.’”). 
 187. Id. at 92 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 188. Id. at 35. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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1996, O’Donnabhain began seeing Diane Ellaborn, a licensed 
psychotherapist.191 “After diagnosing severe GID in petitioner 
[O’Donnabhain] in early 1997, Ellaborn administered a course of 
treatment” in accordance with WPATH’s Standards of Care.192 
Pursuant to her prescribed treatment, O’Donnabhain began hormone 
therapy in September 1997, which she continued through the taxable 
year 2001.193 O’Donnabhain began presenting herself publicly as 
female in March 2000.194 
Despite her positive response to hormone therapy and public 
transition to the female gender role, O’Donnabhain’s “anxiety as a 
result of having male genitalia persisted,” and Ellaborn determined 
that, absent surgery, “petitioner’s anxiety . . . would impair her ability 
to function normally in society.”195 Ellaborn and a second licensed 
psychotherapist, Dr. Alex Coleman, provided the two required 
recommendations in favor of gender conformity surgery.196 In 2001, 
at their referrals, O’Donnabhain underwent pre-surgery consultation 
and gender conformity surgery performed by Dr. Toby Meltzer, a 
“board-certified plastic and reconstructive surgeon, with over 10 
years’ experience specializing in” gender conformity surgery.197 
During 2001, O’Donnabhain incurred and paid the following 
expenditures, which she claimed as deductible medical expenses on 
her 2001 federal income tax return:198 
(1) $19,195 to Dr. Meltzer for surgical procedures, including 
$14,495 for vaginoplasty and other procedures, $4,500 for 
breast augmentation, and $200 towards a portion of 
petitioner’s postsurgical stay at Dr. Meltzer’s facility; (2) $60 
for medical equipment; (3) $1,544 in travel and lodging costs 
away from home for presurgical consultation and surgery; (4) 
$300 to Ms. Ellaborn for therapy; (5) $260 for the 
consultation for a second referral letter for surgery; and (6) 
$382 for hormone therapy. These payments [which totaled 
 
 191. Id. at 36. 
 192. Id. at 39. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 39–40. 
 195. Id. at 40. 
 196. Id. at 41. 
 197. Id. at 40–41. 
 198. Id. at 42. 
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$21,741] were not compensated for by insurance or 
otherwise.199 
During a subsequent audit, the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS 
expressed doubt that the expenses were incurred either “to promote 
the proper functioning of [O’Donnabhain’s] body” or “for treatment 
of a disfiguring condition” and thus concluded that the expenses did 
not qualify for the exception to the cosmetic surgery exclusion.200 It 
also cited the opinions of a Dr. Paul McHugh concerning the 
“controversial” nature of surgery and other treatments for gender 
dysphoria.201 Subsequently, the IRS determined that none of those 
expenses qualified for the medical deduction, and it denied 
O’Donnabhain’s deductions and demanded a return of her tax 
refund.202 O’Donnabhain then petitioned the U.S. Tax Court for a 
determination whether that denial was in error. 
B.  Opposition to WPATH’s Standards of Care: 
Historical Context of the IRS Response 
Ample evidence demonstrates that, at the time of its decision to 
deny O’Donnabhain’s deductions, the IRS was under a great deal of 
pressure not to allow medical deductions for transgender transition-
related health care, which may have biased the IRS in favor of denying 
O’Donnabhain’s deduction. The IRS Office of Chief Counsel cited 
controversial research by Dr. Paul McHugh (then leader of President 
George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics) in its advice to the Boston 
IRS Appeals Office, which office thereafter denied O’Donnabhain’s 
requested medical deductions.203 Dr. McHugh, who was and remains 
an outspoken opponent of WPATH’s Standards of Care, has stated 
that those who enable transgender people to undergo the transition 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Memorandum Number 200603025, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNS. I.R.S. 1, 5 (Oct. 14, 2005), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0603025.pdf. 
 201. Id. (“In light of the Congressional emphasis on denying a deduction for procedures relating 
to appearance in all but a few circumstances and the controversy surrounding whether GRS [gender 
reassignment surgery] is a treatment for an illness or disease, the materials submitted do not support 
a deduction.”). 
 202. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 42 (IRS “disallowed [the foregoing medical expenditures] in 
a notice of deficiency.”). 
 203. Katherine Pratt, The Tax Definition of “Medical Care:” A Critique of the Startling IRS 
Arguments in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 313, 333–34, 344 (2016) 
(citing Memorandum Number 200603025, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNS. I.R.S. 1, 5 (Oct. 14, 2005), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0603025.pdf. 
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process are “collaborating with madness.”204 In addition, around the 
same time, a conservative Christian advocacy group, the Traditional 
Values Coalition, sent Mark Everson, IRS Commissioner under 
President Bush, a letter “to demand that the IRS not allow a deduction 
for O’Donnabhain’s costs of medical transition,” citing views 
expressed by Dr. McHugh.205 The pressure was at least partially 
successful: the IRS (including its Office of Chief Counsel) frequently 
cited Dr. McHugh’s views in IRS advice and arguments throughout 
the subsequent tax litigation.206 
In a widely read Op-Ed published in the Wall Street Journal, Dr. 
McHugh contends that transgender people suffer from the “disordered 
assumption” that one’s experienced gender differs from the gender he 
describes as “given in nature,” that is, the traditionally perceived 
binary gender (male or female), usually assigned based on one’s 
genitalia at birth (sometimes referred to as one’s “natal gender” within 
the medical community).207 He explains that typical “disordered 
assumptions” recognized by the psychiatric community include the 
disordered assumptions associated with anorexia and bulimia nervosa, 
wherein “the dangerously thin [believe] that they are overweight.”208 
Applying this reasoning, Dr. McHugh advocates not for validation of 
transgender individuals’ perceived gender with gender conformity 
surgery and other gender-conforming procedures, but rather for 
treatment of their “disordered assumption” with psychotherapy and 
medication designed to realign the patient’s perceived gender with the 
patient’s natal sex.209 
 
 204. Michael W. Chapman, Johns Hopkins Psychiatrist: Support of Transgenderism and Sex-
Change Surgery is ‘Collaborating with Madness’, CNS NEWS (June 2, 2016), http://www.cnsnews. 
com/blog/michael-w-chapman/johns-hopkins-psychiatrist-support-transgenderism-and-sex-
change-surgery. 
 205. Pratt, supra note 203, at 317 (citing Katherine T. Phan, TVC Asks IRS to Reverse Tax 
Deduction for Sex-Change Operation, CHRISTIAN POST (Dec. 15, 2004), https://www.christianpost 
.com/news/tvc-asks-irs-to-reverse-tax-deduction-for-sex-change-operation-20790). 
 206. Pratt, supra note 203, at 348–52. 
 207. Paul McHugh, Transgender Surgery Isn’t the Solution, WALL STREET J. (June 12, 2014, 
2:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paul-mchugh-transgender-surgery-isnt-the-solution-1402 
615120; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). 
 208. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207. 
 209. Id.; Paul R. McHugh, Surgical Sex: Why We Stopped Doing Sex Change Operations, 
FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2004), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2004/11/surgical-sex (further 
describing his views and reasons for ceasing gender reassignment surgery at Johns Hopkins 
Hospital). 
[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:17 PM 
42 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51: 1 
To support his position, Dr. McHugh cites a 1970s Johns Hopkins 
University study — conducted while he was head of psychiatry at that 
university — that found little difference in psychological health when 
comparing the outcomes of transgender people who had undergone 
surgery with the outcomes of those who did not.210 This study has been 
criticized in that it is unverified and was not published in a peer-
reviewed medical journal, but rather in a religious publication.211 
Further, Dr. McHugh’s reliance on the study ignores an obvious 
alternative explanation: that is, because not all transgender people 
suffer from gender dysphoria and desire to undergo hormone 
treatment and surgery, it would make sense that, in a group of 
transgender people, some of whom experienced gender dysphoria and 
chose to undergo gender conformity surgery, and some of whom chose 
to forego gender conformity surgery (either because they did not 
experience gender dysphoria or because their dysphoria was 
sufficiently treated by non-surgical methods alone), all would 
experience generally similar psychological outcomes and levels of 
satisfaction with their choices.212 
Dr. McHugh also cites a 2011 study that revealed that “beginning 
about 10 years after having the surgery, the transgendered [sic] [who 
had undergone gender conformity surgery] began to experience 
increasing mental difficulties. Most shockingly, their suicide mortality 
rose almost 20-fold above the comparable nontransgender 
population.”213 Although the results of this study are certainly 
disturbing, the data may not actually be statistically significant, given 
the small sample size and the fact that transgender Americans 
experience more than 25-fold rates of attempted suicide compared to 
non-transgender Americans.214 A 20-fold rate might actually represent 
a decline for post-gender conformity surgery individuals relative to the 
transgender population at large. True enough, after Dr. McHugh cited 
 
 210. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207. 
 211. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 67 n.47 (2010). 
 212. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 36, at 6 (“. . . transgender, 
and gender nonconforming individuals are not inherently disordered. Rather, the distress of gender 
dysphoria, when present, is the concern that might be diagnosable and for which various treatment 
options are available.”). 
 213. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207. 
 214. Ann P. Haas et al., Suicide Attempts Among Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming 
Adults: Findings of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, THE WILLIAMS INST. 1, 2 
(Jan. 2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-
Report-Final.pdf. 
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this study, Dr. Dan Karasic, a psychiatrist and WPATH board 
member, published a response that characterized Dr. McHugh’s 
description of the study as a misrepresentation.215 In his response, Dr. 
Karasic indicates that “the increased mortality [above the comparable 
non-transgender population] is in those who had surgery before 1989, 
and that mortality in trans people after 1989 is not statistically different 
from the general population.”216 Dr. Karasic also points to a more 
recent study by the same researcher, published in 2014, which 
indicates that regret rates have been declining significantly in recent 
decades: 
The risk of regretting the procedure was higher if one had 
been granted a new legal gender before 1990 . . . . For the 
two last decades, the regret rate was 2.4% (1991–2000) and 
0.3% (2001–2010), respectively. The decline in the regret 
rate for the whole period 1960–2010 was significant.217 
This recent study indicates that, since 1990, regret rates surrounding 
gender conformity surgery have decreased dramatically, perhaps due, 
in part, to advances in medical techniques. This information further 
undermines the conclusions Dr. McHugh draws from the older 2011 
study, which took place between 1973 and 2003.218 
Finally, Dr. McHugh characterizes the treatment of transgender 
and gender nonconforming children as “close to child abuse,” stating 
that puberty-delaying hormones “stunt . . . children’s growth and risk 
causing sterility.”219 He further implies that these risks are 
unnecessary, as “close to 80% of such children would abandon their 
confusion and grow naturally into adult life if untreated.”220 If these 
statements accurately depicted treatment of gender nonconforming 
 
 215. Dan Karasic, Wall Street Journal Editorial Critiques Transgender Health, WORLD PROF. 




 216. Id. 
 217. Cecilia Dhejne et al., An Analysis of All Applications for Sex Reassignment Surgery in 
Sweden, 1960–2010: Prevalence, Incidence, and Regrets, 43 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 1535, 
1543 (2014). 
 218. Cecilia Dhejne et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex 
Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden, PLOS ONE (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0016885. 
 219. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207; McHugh, Surgical Sex, supra note 209, 
at 36–37. 
 220. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207. 
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children, then certainly this treatment would be problematic. 
However, Dr. Karasic’s response states that this is a 
mischaracterization as well, writing: 
As McHugh states, most gender nonconforming children do 
not identify as transgender in adulthood. However, those who 
receive puberty blocking drugs do not do so until puberty, 
when trans identity is likely to persist. These drugs allow 
adolescents and their parents to work with doctors to achieve 
the best outcome. This approach was demonstrated to be 
successful in research in the Netherlands before being 
adopted widely in the U.S.221 
Dr. Karasic concludes his response by stating that “[t]he American 
Psychiatric Association and [WPATH] no longer view transgender 
identity as inherently pathological. Dr. McHugh’s views are stuck in 
the past.”222 The modern medical community’s thorough acceptance 
of the WPATH Standards of Care implies that Dr. McHugh’s pressure 
on the IRS Commissioner in 2004 was guided by his strongly-held 
bias and was unsupported by verifiable studies. Further, the IRS 
response in this situation indicates a potential tendency for IRS rulings 
on contentious tax issues to differ depending on the current 
administration’s views, rather than be guided by an impartial reading 
of the tax code. 
C.  Overview of the Tax Court: Implications for Future Petitioners 
It is worth mentioning that O’Donnabhain could have chosen to 
sue the Commissioner of Revenue in either a federal district court or 
in the U.S. Tax Court; her choice to sue in the U.S. Tax Court is 
significant for two reasons.223 First, the Tax Court is an entity that is 
independent from the IRS, the 19 members of which are presidentially 
appointed.224 The Tax Court is “a court of record established by 
Congress under Article I of the U.S. Constitution.”225 The Supreme 
Court, in a five-four decision in 1991, explained that, in its current 
incarnation, although it is not an Article III court, it is an “Article I 
 
 221. Karasic, supra note 215. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Suits Against the United States and Claims for Damages under IRC § 7433, IRS (Jan. 13, 
2017), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-003-003.html. 
 224. About the Court, U.S. TAX COURT (Aug. 2016), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm 
(hereinafter “U.S. Tax Court, About the Court”). 
 225. Id. 
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legislative court” and “exercises a portion of the judicial power of the 
United States.”226 Accordingly, Tax Court holdings apply to all 
American taxpayers, and the IRS has specifically confirmed that it will 
follow the decision in O’Donnabhain.227 However, most Tax Court 
opinions — specifically, those denominated “memo” and “summary” 
opinions — historically have “lack[ed] precedential value” even in 
later Tax Court cases, and they are not binding on federal appellate 
courts in any event.228 Full-court opinions like the O’Donnabhain 
decision, sometimes referred to as “reviewed opinions,” do have 
precedential value insofar as later Tax Court panels must follow 
them.229 Yet, following traditional rules of stare decisis, neither 
federal district courts nor federal courts of appeals are bound to treat 
any Tax Court decision as precedent230 or even deserving of 
deference.231 Hence, the Tax Court’s O’Donnabhain decision, despite 
its potentially pivotal role in determining the outcomes for future tax 
issues, cannot direct the decisions of federal appellate courts 
concerning whether gender dysphoria constitutes a disease and, by 
extension, whether gender conformity surgery and other gender 
conforming treatments that alter the appearance constitute deductible 
“medical care” or non-deductible “cosmetic surgery” when used to 
treat a mental illness. For future taxpayers seeking to bring similar 
challenges in a court bound to follow the O’Donnabhain ruling, then, 
the Tax Court is their obvious choice. 
 
 226. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891–92 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 227. Thomas D. Moffitt, Action on Decision, IRB No. 2011-47, IRS (Nov. 21, 2011) available 
at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-aod/aod201103.pdf. 
 228. Amandeep S. Grewal, The Un-Precedented Tax Court, 101 IOWA L. REV. 2065, 2066–67 
(2016). 
 229. Id. at 2065 n.7; Battat v. Comm’r, No. 17784-12, 2017 WL 449951, at *9 (T.C. Feb. 2, 
2017) (“Tax Court opinions are subject to stare decisis.”); Smith v. Comm’r, 926 F.2d 1470, 1479 
(6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Tax Court is bound by stare decisis, but that the full court can 
overrule a prior Tax Court decision, and explaining how it “know[s] of no authority which prevents 
a court, sitting en banc, from overruling one of its prior decisions when it has determined that the 
rule is outdated and an impediment to legal process”). 
 230. Carroll v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 2d 328, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated on other 
grounds, 339 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he decision of the Tax Court . . . would not be entitled to 
stare decisis effect in this [federal district court] any more than the decision of a federal district 
court sitting in Illinois would be entitled to stare decisis effect in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit.”). 
 231. Maier v. Comm’r, 360 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Madison Recycling Assocs. 
v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 280, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2002) for the proposition that “[w]e owe no deference 
to the Tax Court’s statutory interpretations, its relationship to us being that of a district court to a 
court of appeals, not that of an administrative agency to a court of appeals”). 
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For such taxpayers, a second factor weighing in favor of the Tax 
Court is cost. The relatively low costs of the Tax Court might be 
beneficial to transgender taxpayers who, as discussed above, 
experience disproportionate levels of poverty. Other than a $60 filing 
fee when filing the petition, there are no other court costs associated 
with litigating a case before the Tax Court.232 Meanwhile, fees to bring 
a case before U.S. District Courts tend to be much higher and vary by 
state. For example, the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, 
O’Donnabhain’s home state, charges $195 to file a Civil Complaint or 
Petition, and there may be other fees involved depending on the filings 
of the petitioner.233 Perhaps more significantly for a litigant of modest 
means, “[o]nce the petition is filed [in Tax Court], payment of the 
underlying tax ordinarily is postponed until the case has been 
decided.”234 The same is not true in federal district court, where the 
taxpayer would be required to pay the tax balance before suing for a 
refund. Prior to the trial date, interest continues to accrue upon the 
petitioner’s unpaid tax balance, however, the petitioner can “stop the 
interest accrual before going to tax court by making a payment and 
labeling it as a deposit.”235 
D.  The U.S. Tax Court’s Decision in O’Donnabhain 
For better or worse, given the foregoing considerations, 
O’Donnabhain brought her case in the Tax Court and not federal 
district court. The Tax Court, in an 11-5 decision, ruled in favor of 
allowing deductions as “medical care” for certain of O’Donnabhain’s 
treatments — her hormone therapy, gender conformity surgery, and 
transportation — but disallowed deduction of the cost of her breast 
augmentation surgery, ruling that the latter was excluded by the 
cosmetic surgery exception to the definition of deductible medical 
care. The majority opinion addressed the following issues: 
 
 232. U.S. Tax Court, About the Court, supra note 224. There are of course litigation costs, such 
as attorney fees, expert witness fees, etc., but those would presumably be the same whether the 
taxpayer chose the Tax Court or a federal district court. 
 233. Boston Municipal Court and District Court Filing Fees, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov 
/courts/court-info/filing-fees/dc-fees-gen.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 234. U.S. Tax Court, About the Court, supra note 224. 
 235. Mark P. Cussen, Tax Court: Your Last Resort, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia. 
com/articles/tax/09/tax-court-last-resort.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
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1. Whether gender identity disorder, or GID, constituted a 
“disease” for purposes of section 213 of the Internal Revenue 
Code,236 
2. If so, whether O’Donnabhain suffered from GID,237 and 
3. If so, whether O’Donnabhain’s hormone therapy, gender 
conformity surgery, and breast augmentation constitute 
“treatment” of her GID, and were thus deductible medical 
care expenses for purposes of section 213.238 
As a threshold matter, the Court held that GID does constitute a 
“disease” for purposes of section 213.239 As rationale, the Court cited 
GID’s classification as a mental disorder in DSM-IV,240 “widespread 
recognition of the condition in medical literature,”241 and GID’s nature 
as “a serious, psychologically debilitating condition” that “poses a 
serious medical need,” as recognized by “every U.S. Court of Appeals 
that has ruled on the question.”242 
The Court next turned to the issue whether the petitioner suffered 
from the “disease” GID. It rejected the IRS’s argument that 
O’Donnabhain was not correctly diagnosed with GID, holding that 
O’Donnabhain’s GID diagnosis was “substantially supported by the 
record.”243 Specifically, the Court cited the qualifications and opinions 
of O’Donnabhain’s treating psychotherapist: Ellaborn was licensed to 
diagnose GID, she had ample experience treating transgender patients, 
she did, in fact, make such a diagnosis, and she gave “persuasive” 
testimony regarding the methodology behind her diagnosis and the 
ruling out of other conditions.244 The Court noted that Dr. Coleman, 
the second licensed professional who examined O’Donnabhain, 
concurred in the diagnosis and in the appropriateness of treatment 
through gender conformity surgery.245 Finally, the Court cited the 
concurrence of O’Donnabhain’s expert witness, Dr. George Brown, 
 
 236. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 55 (2010). 
 237. Id. at 63. 
 238. Id. at 64. 
 239. Id. at 59. 
 240. Id. at 60. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 61–62 (referring to opinions from seven of the U.S. Courts of Appeals that “have 
concluded that severe GID or transsexualism constitutes a ‘serious medical need’ for the purposes 
of the Eighth Amendment” and noting that “[n]o U.S. Court of Appeals has held otherwise”). 
 243. Id. at 63. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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whom it acknowledged as “a recognized authority in the field.”246 The 
Court ruled that the testimony of these three witnesses, all of whom 
had examined O’Donnabhain, was entitled to greater weight than the 
testimony of the IRS’s two expert witnesses, who had not.247 
Having concluded that GID is a “disease” within the meaning of 
the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of “medical care” and that 
O’Donnabhain did indeed suffer from it, the Court then turned to the 
issue whether the various costs that O’Donnabhain sought to deduct 
qualified as payments for “treatment” or other “medical care” for GID 
and were thus eligible for the medical deduction, and did not instead 
fall into the exception for non-deductible “cosmetic surgery,” as the 
IRS maintained. The Court held that, although O’Donnabhain’s 
gender conformity surgery and hormone therapy “treated” her GID for 
purposes of section 213,248 on the facts of this case, her breast 
augmentation did not.249 Concerning its holding that the gender 
conformity surgery and hormone therapy were deductible, the Court 
cited case law and standard dictionary definitions of “treatment,” and 
found that hormone therapy and gender conformity surgery were 
treatments of GID under both of these definitions insofar as they both 
relieved or cured its symptoms.250 
The Court decided, however, that O’Donnabhain’s breast 
augmentation surgery fell into the “cosmetic surgery” exception and 
was not therefore a deductible medical treatment because she provided 
insufficient documentation of any breast-related anxiety that would be 
treated and ameliorated by augmentation.251 As the basis of its 
reasoning, the majority of the Court applied the relevant statutory 
language that describes the cosmetic surgery exception (that surgery 
designed to “improve the patient’s appearance” is non-deductible 
“cosmetic surgery” unless it meets one of three conditions, namely 
that it (1) is “necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from . . . a 
congenital abnormality,” (2) “promote[s] the proper function of the 
body” or (3) “prevent[s] or treat[s] illness or disease”).252 The court 
ruled out the first condition on the grounds that “Petitioner has not 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 70. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 72–73. 
 252. See supra section III(B) (describing I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)). 
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argued, or adduced evidence, that the breast augmentation surgery 
ameliorated a deformity within the meaning of section 
213(d)(9)(A).”253 It then ruled out the second condition, noting that 
“the parties [had] stipulated that petitioner’s breast augmentation ‘did 
not promote the proper function of her breasts.’”254 
To evaluate whether the third condition applied, the Court 
reviewed Dr. Meltzer’s presurgical notes and testimony, which 
indicated that O’Donnabhain had developed B-cup breasts of a “very 
nice shape” due to hormone therapy treatments and from which the 
Court concluded that no deformity was present.255 It noted that 
O’Donnabhain had produced no evidence of breast-related anxiety or 
distress that the augmentation could have been justified as treating, as 
required by the WPATH Standards of Care.256 The majority therefore 
concluded that the third condition did not apply and that, because 
O’Donnabhain’s “breast augmentation surgery meets the definition of 
‘cosmetic surgery’ in section 213(d)(9)(B), it is not ‘medical care’ that 
is deductible pursuant to section 213(a).”257 Several judges issued 
concurring opinions, noting that they agreed with the result but not the 
majority’s reasoning. In one such concurrence, Judge Halpern stated 
that he generally agreed with the majority opinion, but disapproved of 
the majority’s reference to the “apparent normalcy” of 
O’Donnabhain’s breasts as a “superfluous and potentially misleading” 
reason to deny the deduction for O’Donnabhain’s breast-augmentation 
surgery.258 Rather, Judge Halpern agreed with the decision to deny the 
deduction solely because of O’Donnabhain’s failure to show that her 
doctors documented her “breast-engendered anxiety” in accordance 
with WPATH’s Standards of Care.259 Implicitly, had O’Donnabhain 
adequately documented such “breast-engendered anxiety”260 related 
to her GID, then the breast augmentation would have been considered 
a medical treatment to treat the illness of GID, and the deduction for 
that surgery would have been allowed as well. 
 
 253. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 72. 
 254. Id. at 73. 
 255. Id. at 72–73. 
 256. Id. at 73. The O’Donnabhain Court refers to the WPATH Standards of Care as the 
Benjamin standards, in reference to the previous name of the organization. 
 257. Id. at 72. 
 258. Id. at 77–78. 
 259. Id. at 77. 
 260. Id. at 73. 
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Before ending its inquiry, however, the majority opinion 
overreached in two ways, seemingly applying two tests that do not 
find their source in the Internal Revenue Code. First, the Court 
discussed at length the degree to which the WPATH Standards of Care 
are accepted “in the psychiatric profession” and, more generally, in 
the medical community at large, considering whether that acceptance 
is “limited,” “broad,” “widespread,” or “substantial.”261 These 
qualifiers and the requirement for any specific degree of “acceptance” 
are not prescribed by section 213 of the Code, or any other section for 
that matter. In fact, numerous opinions of the Tax Court have allowed 
deductions for treatments that were surely less widely accepted by the 
medical community than the WPATH Standards of Care. For instance, 
as the O’Donnabhain majority itself pointed out, the Tax Court has 
previously approved medical deductions for such non-mainstream 
treatments as naturopathic and holistic cancer treatments, Navajo 
healing ceremonies or “sings,” acupuncture, and Christian Science 
practitioner services262 — “treatments that are highly unlikely to 
survive rigorous scientific review.”263 As the Court in those matters 
understood, the “deductibility of medical care payments under section 
213 is not strictly limited to traditional medical procedures” but rather 
“allows medical expense deductions for ‘nontraditional’ medical 
care.”264 The relevant inquiry is not whether a treatment is 
universally — or even widely — accepted as the best and most 
appropriate treatment by the majority of traditional medical doctors. 
Instead, the inquiry is simply whether the treatment fits the definition 
of medical care under section 213 and is one that the taxpayer and his 
medical care provider believe will aid in diagnosing, curing, 
mitigating, treating or preventing a disease by, for instance, relieving 
the taxpayer’s symptoms. By its lengthy examination of the degree of 
acceptance of the WPATH Standards of Care, the Tax Court applied 
an unnecessary and unfounded test to transgender care that it has not 
applied to other treatments and forms of care; in so doing, it may have 
created precedent that will help future patients obtain insurance 
coverage for transition-related care. Yet the inquiry was unnecessary 
 
 261. Id. at 65–68. 
 262. Id. at 69 (citing Dickie v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916 (T.C. 1999); Crain v. Comm’r, 
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 806 (1986); Tso v. Comm’r, 401 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277 (1980); Rev. Rul. 72–593, 
1972–2 C.B. 180; Rev. Rul. 55–261, 1955–1 C.B. 307). 
 263. Id. at 91. 
 264. See, e.g., Dickie v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1918. 
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for the determination before the Court and should not be seen to create 
an extra hurdle for a single class of taxpayers. 
In another concurrence, Judge Holmes noted the danger of 
politicizing the courts and inserting judges into medical debates, and 
expressed concerns with the majority’s search for consensus 
surrounding the Standards of Care as a means to establishing their 
legitimacy as accepted medical procedures. Judge Holmes explained, 
“The consensus of WPATH is not necessarily the consensus of the 
entire medical community.”265 Although there is, indeed, wide 
consensus surrounding WPATH’s Standards of Care, Judge Holmes 
was right to point out that excess emphasis on consensus may come at 
a cost to future taxpayers. Ultimately, the Court explained that 
regardless of the controversy surrounding the efficacy of gender 
conformity surgery and hormone therapy, case law under section 213 
indicated that “complete consensus on the advisability or efficacy of a 
procedure is not necessary for a deduction . . . .”266 However, the 
decision to wade into the topic sets the Court on a path down a slippery 
slope of questioning the treatment choices of taxpayers; those patients 
with lesser-understood conditions, those who seek treatments that 
have not yet achieved consensus among all health care providers, and 
other marginalized patients may be unjustifiably denied a deduction. 
Further, the Court applied a second, unnecessary, and unfounded 
test when it considered whether the two procedures, gender 
conformity surgery and hormone treatment, were medically necessary, 
despite the fact that the section 213 does not require such a finding as 
a precondition to deductibility. The IRS argued that “medical 
necessity” was a “requirement intended by Congress to apply to 
procedures directed at improving appearance.”267 The majority 
opinion implicitly acknowledged that a “medical necessity” 
requirement is not expressly prescribed by the Code; it stated that it 
need not decide whether to infer such a requirement “notwithstanding 
the absence of the phrase in the statute.”268 It explained that the 
requirement “would not bar the deductions at issue, inasmuch as . . . 
 
 265. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 88 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 266. Id. at 69. 
 267. Id. at 74. 
 268. Id. 
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petitioner has shown that her sex reassignment surgery was medically 
necessary.”269 The majority explained: 
Given Dr. Brown’s expert testimony, the judgment of the 
professional treating petitioner, the agreement of all three 
experts [O’Donnabhain’s one expert and both of the IRS’s] 
that untreated GID can result in self-mutilation and suicide, 
and . . . the views of a significant segment of knowledgeable 
professionals that sex reassignment surgery is medically 
necessary for severe GID, the Court is persuaded that 
petitioner’s sex reassignment surgery was medically 
necessary.270 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Holmes weighed in to criticize the 
majority for unnecessarily considering whether O’Donnabhain’s 
various treatments were “medically necessary,” when that requirement 
is not found in the tax code.271 Judge Holmes aptly explained that it 
“is not essential to the holding and drafts our Court into culture wars 
in which tax lawyers have heretofore claimed noncombatant 
status.”272 
Just as the Court’s inquiry into the degree of acceptance of the 
WPATH Standards of Care was irrelevant, so too was the Court’s 
inquiry into medical necessity. Not only is the requirement not found 
in the Internal Revenue Code, the phrase “medical necessity” has been 
used only very rarely in prior decisions regarding the medical 
deduction, in cases where the expenditure was for items barely related 
to medical treatment at all. For instance, the petitioners in Garcia v. 
Commissioner273 tried to deduct the cost of heating and cooling their 
home and the cost of a lawn care service, and in questioning the 
“medical necessity” of those expenditures, the Tax Court questioned 
whether the treatments were even medical in nature, not whether those 
treatments were preferred or required by the medical community for a 
particular disease or condition.274 Moreover, there is no universally-
 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). 
 271. Id. at 90–97 (Holmes, J., concurring). Other judges filed concurring and dissenting 
opinions on related issues, but this Article does not address them. 
 272. Id. at 85. 
    273.   111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 (T.C. 2016). 
 274. Id. at 17; see also Lenn v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1892 (T.C. 1998) (disallowing legal 
fees that were not necessary to obtain medical care or a legitimate a method of treatment, but rather 
incurred during an effort to obtain reimbursement for private school tuition for taxpayer’s son from 
a public school district). 
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recognized definition of medical necessity, and even the IRS’s expert 
acknowledged that “the definition of medical necessity ‘varies 
according to the defining party.’”275 Significantly, the U.S. Tax Court 
has found that section 213 allows deductions for medical care even 
without a physician referral,276 one of the two essential prongs in 
typical definitions of medical necessity in the insurance context, as 
discussed above. By delving into an evaluation of medical necessity, 
without first reaching a clear decision regarding the definition of 
medical necessity or whether the inquiry was even appropriate, the 
majority not only inserted itself into an unnecessary debate outside the 
expertise of most tax judges, but it also set an example that may 
introduce unintended barriers to controversial medical care in future 
cases and cast the courts as ill-equipped decision-makers in the 
medical arena. Depending on the defining party, medical necessity’s 
definition may change — and, due to the overreach of the Court in this 
case, that definition may have significant bearing over whether a 
future taxpayer’s chosen medical treatment is deductible. 
Significantly, this may bring additional challenges to future taxpayers 
who might, as a result of this opinion, be asked to satisfy more onerous 
burdens of proof to show that their chosen treatment was medically 
necessary in their case, even though medical necessity is not required 
by statute. 
Although the Court properly held that hormone therapy and 
gender conformity surgery are treatments for GID for purposes of 
deduction under section 213, its inquiry should have ended there. In 
sum, its decision even to entertain the respondent’s arguments 
surrounding “medical necessity” and “wide acceptance” is 
problematic for future decisions regarding the deductibility of other 
controversial medical care since “medical necessity” and “wide 
acceptance” are not thresholds that are imposed by the applicable 
laws, and the decision potentially creates a hurdle for marginalized 
populations not imposed on other taxpayers.277 Because medical 
consensus regarding the merits and acceptance of a treatment and 
determinations of medical necessity have not historically been 
 
 275. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 75. 
 276. See Dickie v. Comm’r 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916, 1918–19 (T.C. 1999) (“More importantly, 
section 213 does not preclude deduction of amounts expended for medical care even though such 
care was not prescribed by a medical doctor.”). 
 277. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 70. 
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necessary to qualify those treatments as medical care, to impose 
requirements of medical necessity and consensus in this case 
contradicts precedent, is unjustly burdensome, and unfairly limits 
patient choice in seeking affordable medical care. Those portions of 
the majority opinion should instead be treated as the dicta that they 
are. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Following the Tax Court’s decision in 2010, many lauded 
O’Donnabhain as the first of many policy-based changes in favor of 
transgender rights.278 However, more recent actions, such as the 
federal court injunction of HHS’s regulation prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of transgender status by insurers and health 
providers, the commitment by HHS to reassess that regulation, the 
prohibition on the CDC’s use of the term transgender, and the Trump 
administration’s determination to ban military service by transgender 
individuals and to ban the use of federal funds for transition-related 
care for military members, putatively based at least in part on the cost 
of transgender care,279 prove that the future of transgender health care 
is far from certain. 
Moving forward, at the next opportunity presented by an 
appropriate case, the Tax Court should clarify that its inquiry into 
“medical necessity” and “wide acceptance” in the O’Donnabhain case 
was merely dicta and not intended to create new requirements out of 
whole cloth. As discussed above, the meaning of “medically 
necessary” for the purposes of health care insurance coverage can vary 
between states and between insurance providers, and sometimes even 
lacks an explicit definition. Notably, the Tax Court did not define this 
term in its opinion, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the 
Tax Court uses the plain language definition of “necessary” for the 
purposes of its analysis. Due to ambiguities in the definition of 
“medical necessity”, the fact that the Internal Revenue Code does not 
use the term “medical necessity”, and the general overreach of the 
Court in its analysis thereof, the Court should clarify its position to 
 
 278. O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GLAD, https://www.glad.org/ 
cases/in-re-rhiannon-odonnabhain/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2018). 
 279. Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, 82 Fed. Reg. 41319 (Aug. 25, 2017) (banning transgender participation in the U.S. armed 
forces). 
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prevent the imposition of an unnecessary — and unfounded — hurdle 
on future taxpayers. Advocates and other interested parties may want 
to identify an appropriate case to bring the issue to the forefront, or to 
request a revenue ruling from the IRS. 
At a more fundamental level, so long as insurance coverage for 
transition-related care is not universally protected from discriminatory 
exclusions under state and federal law, attorneys and policy experts 
must continue to support the longevity of the medical deduction within 
Internal Revenue Code. In all, O’Donnabhain’s deductions, in 2017 
dollars, equate to $23,715.19 (or $29,904.98 if including breast 
augmentation surgery), which given the average American’s effective 
tax rate of 29.8%280 would amount to a one-time savings of 
approximately $7,067.13 in avoided taxes ($8,911.68 if including 
breast augmentation).281 Yet the initial U.S. House of Representatives 
draft of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act had proposed to repeal the medical 
deduction entirely, while increasing the standard deduction to $24,400 
for married couples filing jointly.282 If O’Donnabhain were to pursue 
the same treatments today, assuming that she provided adequate 
documentation of distress and anxiety to deduct her breast 
augmentation costs, and if Congress had, in fact, eliminated the 
medical deduction, O’Donnabhain would lose out on a deduction of 
almost $18,000 (the $29,905 cost minus the standard $12,000 
deduction, for a loss of approximately $5,364 in tax savings at a tax 
rate of 29.8%283), ceteris paribus. Even without allowing a deduction 
for breast augmentation surgery, O’Donnabhain’s itemized medical 
deductions would still exceed the new standard deduction by almost 
$12,000. While the medical deduction was not ultimately eliminated 
by the 2017 tax legislation,284 the issue is sure to arise again in future 
legislation. Interested parties will need to be vigilant in monitoring 
proposed legislation and advocating for retaining it in the face of 
future legislative threats. 
 
 280. Matthew Frankel, What’s the Average American’s Tax Rate?, MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 4, 
2017, 7:31 AM), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2017/03/04/whats-the-average-americans-tax-
rate.aspx. 
 281. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 282. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. §§ 1308, 1002 (2017) (discussing proposed 
repeal of the medical expense deduction and enhancement of the standard deduction). 
 283. Frankel, supra note 280 (showing that the average American’s effective tax rate, including 
state/local, Federal, Social Security, and Medicare taxes, is about 29.8%). 
 284. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11027, 131 Stat. 2044. 
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Transgender people are only one demographic who could face 
negative externalities if future attempts to repeal the medical 
deduction come to fruition. As just one example, people with 
disabilities currently can use this deduction to deduct expenses 
associated with specialized care, household accommodations, and 
travel to and from specialist appointments. Likewise, the elderly often 
use the deduction to offset costs associated with dental, eye, and long-
term nursing home care not covered by Medicare. Both groups would 
lose the ability to deduct such expenses, which often exceed the 
proposed standard deduction. By preserving the medical deduction 
now and in the future, as well as ensuring that the precedent set by 
O’Donnabhain is upheld within the IRS, transgender people who seek 
medical care—transition-related or otherwise—will be able to deduct 
the out-of-pocket expenses associated with medical procedures that 
are often denied coverage under state Medicaid services and private 
health insurers. 
With regard to protecting the rights of transgender people and 
other members of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
(“LGBT”) community, there are three additional important 
considerations that professionals in the legal, political, and medical 
arenas must explore further. First, in order to ensure that policy-
makers understand fully the experiences and needs of transgender 
Americans, political influencers must first ensure that policy-makers 
have access to reliable data that reaches populations across the United 
States. As indicated above, due to current lack of Census data related 
to gender identity and transgender status, most existing data on 
transgender populations relies on surveys that are often conducted by 
LGBT-focused non-profit organizations.285 As described above, in 
March 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau determined that there was “no 
federal data need” for questions about “sexual orientation and gender 
identity” on the 2020 Census,286 despite requests for the collection of 
such data by “at least four federal agencies, including the Justice 
Department,”287 which wrote a letter to the Census Bureau in 
November 2016 to demonstrate “the legal authority supporting the 
 
 285. Wang, supra note 51. 
 286. Thompson, supra note 52. 
 287. Hansi L. Wang, Census Bureau Found No Need for LGBT Data Despite 4 Agencies 
Requesting it, WGBH NEWS (July 18, 2017), https://news.wgbh.org/2017/07/18/census-bureau-
found-no-need-lgbt-data-despite-4-agencies-requesting-it. 
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necessity for the collection of [LGBT-related] information.”288 Until 
transgender and gender-nonconforming people are recognized in the 
Census and other data collection surveys, the U.S. government will 
not produce large-scale, reliable data concerning the health and other 
outcomes of transgender people in the United States. Continuing to 
exclude such topics and questions on the 2020 Census will eliminate 
opportunities to gather data on a large scale that the government and 
other entities can use to implement effective policies that address 
transgender and gender-nonconforming health care needs.289 
Second, psychiatric groups must consider the implications of 
gender dysphoria’s classification as a mental illness. Some 
transgender rights advocates have voiced criticism that continued 
classification of gender dysphoria as a “disease” or “mental illness” 
will only perpetuate stigma surrounding the transgender and gender 
nonconforming community.290 This rationale is also why the DSM-5 
workgroup on gender dysphoria made the conscious decision to 
remove the word “disorder” when renaming GID.291 As a parallel 
example, some point to the removal of homosexuality from the DSM 
as an important step in the de-stigmatization of homosexuality.292 
Issues of stigmatization aside, treating gender dysphoria as a medical 
disorder poses the risk of creating a “homogenous, medicalized model 
of the ‘ideal’ transgender body” that inhibits access to appropriate 
medical treatment for transgender people who do not fit this mold.293 
As such, it is arguably problematic to continue to provide deductions 
for gender conformity surgery and other treatments for gender 
dysphoria as a “disease” under section 213. 
Yet removing gender dysphoria from the DSM might make it 
even more difficult for transgender people suffering from gender 
dysphoria to obtain approval to deduct transition-related medical care. 
 
 288. Letter from Arthur E. Gary, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John H. Thompson, 
Director, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 4, 2016), 
apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=3892167-DOJ-to-Census-Bureau-2016-11-04-Edit. 
 289. Dinan, supra note 51. 
 290. Katy Steinmetz, Being Transgender is Not a Mental Disorder: Study, TIME HEALTH (July 
26, 2016), http://time.com/4424589/being-transgender-is-not-a-mental-disord. 
 291. Jack Drescher, New Diagnostic Codes Lessen Stigma for Transgender People, MEDSCAPE 
(Sept. 11, 2007), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/885141. 
 292. The History of Psychiatry and Homosexuality, LGBT MENTAL HEALTH SYLLABUS, 
http://www.aglp.org/gap/1_history (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 293. Alesdair H. Ittelson, Trapped in the Wrong Phraseology: O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 
26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 356, 356 (Oct. 26, 2011). 
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One potential solution that protects access to care while reducing 
stigma might involve efforts to educate the public about the true nature 
of gender dysphoria as distress associated with, but distinct from, 
transgender identity. This is a question for policy-makers and medical 
professionals to weigh in the years ahead. This consideration goes 
hand-in-hand with the need for improved training and education of 
health care professionals surrounding the needs of transgender health 
care, so that transgender patients everywhere can have access to 
adequate and compassionate health care. 
Third, and most important, policy experts interested in protecting 
transgender rights must advocate for state- and federal-level 
antidiscrimination protections to prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation and gender identity by health care providers and 
insurers. As discussed above, state-level legislation that both explicitly 
protects private insurer and Medicaid coverage of transition-related 
medical care, in accordance with WPATH’s Standards of Care, as well 
as prohibits health care and other forms of discrimination on the basis 
of gender identity is necessary to ensure that transgender people are 
not denied essential health care on the basis of gender identity. At the 
federal level, protecting transgender health care will require keeping 
and enforcing guidance such as 42 C.F.R. part 92 which, as discussed 
above, has been enjoined indefinitely, despite better-reasoned prior 
case law that indicates that transgender discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination. Given the current presidential administration’s lack of 
support for transgender protections thus far, it is not likely that federal-
level protections will effectively protect transgender patients in the 
near future. Therefore, state-level protections are increasingly critical 
to protecting transgender health care access; fortunately, the states are 
also where demonstrable growth has occurred throughout the past 
several years.294 States wishing to prevent discriminatory health care 
practices will want to consider adopting their own versions of 42 
C.F.R. part 92, with the religious exceptions identified by the 
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. court as appropriate. 
 
 294. See Healthcare Laws and Policies, supra note 140; Healthcare Laws and Policies, 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies[https://web.archive.org/web/20160921174545/http://www.lg
btmap.org:80/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies]; Healthcare Laws and Policies, 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Oct. 7, 2017), http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
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tmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies]. 
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Overall, except for the “widely accepted” and “medically 
necessary” dicta discussed above, O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner 
represents a tremendous success for transgender health care rights and 
offers opportunities for increasing affordable access to transition-
related care. States and, ultimately, federal policymakers must take the 
next steps to promulgate its principles into insurance regulations and 
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